For survivors, the experience of sexual violence causes painful and often chronic physical problems, including (but not limited to) STDs, fistulas, irregular bleeding, and chronic abdominal pain.  However, perhaps an even more distressing outcome of rape in the Congo is the social stigmatization that survivors of sexual violence endure at the hands of their families and communities.  Attitudes towards survivors of sexual violence are quite indicative of the second-class status of women in Congolese society, particularly in underdeveloped, rural areas such as Fizi Territory.

After having suffered from an act of sexual violence, oftentimes a survivor will be banished from her family and derided by her community.  The husband of a survivor may expel her from the home, leaving her without support, kinship, or protection.  A survivor will be labeled (quite erroneously) as the “wife of the soldiers” or a “prostitute”, and openly mocked or shunned.  Thus, the post-rape social ramifications in Fizi Territory are devastating for survivors, especially in a society that places a premium on social interaction.  The shame and rejection may prevent a survivor from participating in income-generating activities (agriculture, commerce), and oftentimes will prevent her from seeking assistance.

SOS FED staff work very hard at encouraging survivors to come to SOS FED for assistance, and work with civil, traditional, and religious authorities to find survivors in the area who need assistance.  Once a survivor has entered a SOS FED center, she can receive group therapy and individual counseling sessions, as well as participate in group income-generating activities that also teach risk-reduction behavior.

However, what happens to a woman once she has completed the 3-month course of assistance provided by SOS FED?  Will she be re-accepted by her family and/or community?  The reintegration process, implemented in 2011, addresses this question.  Each SOS FED center has a male reintegration officer, who acts as an advocate for reintegrating beneficiaries.  Thus far, SOS FED has 3 reintegration officers: Luandja Eca Ricardo (Kikonde), M’Munga Selemane (Kazimia), and Lubunga Wilondja (Mboko).

The reintegration officer is tasked with breaking down the misconceptions about survivors of sexual violence within Congolese society, at least to the point where a survivor is able to rejoin her family and resume her life.  The reintegration meets with the family, in particular the husband, of the soon-to-be reintegrated beneficiary.  The reintegration officer educates the family on the rights of survivors of sexual violence, breaks down the myth that the survivor is to blame for the rape, and tries to convince them to re-accept the survivor back into the family.

The reintegration officer works very closely with the mwami to achieve these goals.  The mwami is a traditional position of authority, also known as the chef coutumiere.  The mwami/chef coutumiere is a hereditary position, passed down from father to son.  A mwami may have a constituency ranging from a village, a quartier, or an entire town.  While having no civil or state authority, traditional authorities are still regarded as important figures in Congolese society.  Ordinary citizens often consult a mwami for counsel on important decisions, the resolution of disputes, or just for simple advice.  State authorities often have to work with the cooperation of the mwami in order to carry out state business.

As a person of authority who is respected by the community, the counsel of a mwami can go a long way in assisting with the integration process.  Before beginning reintegration efforts in a village/town, SOS FED reintegration officers have several meetings with the local mwami to educate them on the principles of reintegration and to gain their support and trust for the reintegration process.  Including the mwami in the reintegration process also helps educate the community at large about the rights of survivors of sexual violence.

SOS FED reintegration officers accompany reintegrating women, often over great distances, to their home villages.  Reintegrating beneficiaries are encouraged to continue the risk-reduction activities they learned at the SOS FED center, as well as disseminate this information among their friends and neighbors.

The success of the reintegration process is quite evident.  According to all three reintegration officers, there has only been one case where a woman was abandoned by her husband after reintegration was carried out.  As of the end of the month of September, 21 beneficiaries have been reintegrated from Kikonde/Kazimia, and 19 beneficiaries have been reintegrated from Mboko.

My next few blog entries will be profiles of several people from in/near Mboko who are involved in the reintegration process: 2 former SOS FED beneficiaries and 2 mwami working closely with SOS FED.

SOS FED beneficiary in Mboko

SOS FED beneficiary in Mboko

Capt. Issokelo Didier, FARDC Magistrate

Capt. Issokelo Didier, FARDC Magistrate

On Thursday, September 1st, I arrived at the military tribunal of Uvira, based on an invitation from the head magistrate, Captain Issokelo Didier. In terms of what I focus on (the fight against sexual violence), there was not too much to learn. However, I found some aspects of the experience to be quite interesting:

-While waiting in the courtroom for the judges to arrive, I struck up a conversation with the three prisoners whose cases were to be heard that day. The three men, decked out in faded orange jumpsuits, were accused of being members of an “insurrectionist movement”, the Mai Mai; these accusations were the basis for their appearance in a military court as opposed to a civilian court. They had all been arrested in December 2009, and they said that this day in court was only the second time they had appeared before a judge since being arrested.

Waiting in court

Waiting in court

-The soldiers assigned to guarding the prisoners were a raggedy, if friendly, group of individuals. I struck up a conversation with a soldier named Jeannot, a miniscule and jocular soldier with several missing front teeth and a battered and dented AK-style assault rifle. I asked Jeannot when he joined the army, and he told me he had first joined as a soldier with the RCD in 1998. I asked him how old he was.

“I was born in 1984,” he said. If what he told me was the truth, this meant he had joined the army when he was fourteen. A year younger than me, and yet Jeannot had already marched as a soldier through 13 years of conflict.

Another soldier, Sergeant Alain, told me that he had joined as a kadogo (child soldier) with Laurent Kabila and the AFDL in 1996; again, he did not look that much older than myself.

I asked the soldiers where they were from. Jeannot told me he was a Mubembe from Fizi Territory. I found many of the soldiers were from Fizi, but there were quite a number from all over the Congo, including Bas-Congo, Nord Kivu, and Katanga. Indeed, this group of soldiers appeared to be the most diverse group of Congolese I had ever seen, from the short Babembe to the towering Katangans. They spoke with each other in an interesting mix of Kiswahili, French, and Lingala. Normally, I do not interact with Congolese soldiers, since under different circumstances they might harass me or worse, but this time it was interesting to see the ordinary FARDC foot soldier “up close”.

Jeannot

Jeannot

-The three military judges were a panel of stern-looking, stern-talking FARDC captains who seemed to speak to the prisoners only in admonishments, alternating between French and Kiswahili. During the court recess, all of them lit up noxious cigarettes, which explained the generally stale, sour odor in the courtroom. When I asked the judges about their qualifications, they simply shrugged their shoulders and said that the military had assigned them to this post.

-All three prisoners had the same lawyer representing them, and after a few opening statements, the lawyer disappeared. After a while, the judges had to call a recess, since the prisoners had no legal representation; since their conviction would carry the death penalty, the judges decided that the trial could proceed no further until the three had a trained jurist present on their behalf. The three prisoners complained that the lawyer was charging them a lot of money ($1500), but doing little work. Since no one of them could afford to hire a lawyer himself, they had pooled their resources to hire one to represent all three of them.

-When I asked Capt. Didier if the death penalty had ever been carried out in Uvira against soldiers convicted of “supporting insurrection”, he shook his head no. He told me that if someone is convicted and sentenced to die, he immediately writes a letter to President Kabila asking for amnesty on behalf of the prisoner.

-According to the new rules set out for FARDC military justice, a FARDC officer can only be tried and convicted by officers of his own rank or greater. Thus, if anyone above Capt. Didier’s rank were being investigated (say, a colonel), a group of higher-ranking judges would have to come down from Bukavu to render a judicial decision in the case.

-Capt. Didier complained quite a bit about the lack of resources allocated to him and his team at the Auditorat. He told me that if an investigator opens a dossier in Shabunda, it may take up to a month for the dossier to arrive in Uvira. I asked if he had pleaded to his superiors for more resources, and he claimed that he had, but to no avail. Capt. Didier also claimed he did not have the resources to hold more military courts or open much-needed parquets in parts of Sud Kivu far away from the tribunal in Uvira. When I look at the dismal state of military justice in Sud Sud Kivu, I wonder about all the resources that numerous organizations (United Nations, European Union, etc) have dedicated to stabilization and security sector reform, and whether any of it is reaching our far-flung corner of the Congo.

Overall, the overwhelming feeling I got from attending this trial was frustration with the Congolese judicial process, both civilian and military. However, it was an eye-opening experience, and I learned quite a bit.

One wonders if the landmark trial and conviction of Col. Kibibi Mutware earlier this year was a start of a new trend or simply an irregular blip in a region fraught with impunity for members of armed groups. Not much of what I saw and heard in my experience with the Uvira Auditorat supported the former. I am willing to give Congolese military justice the benefit of the doubt, but I also believe it is about time both the Congolese government and their international partners take a closer look at what is going on.

If you are interested more in the Congolese justice system, please refer to one of my blogs from 2009, where I visited the Tribunal de la Paix, a court where civil cases are heard. If you want to read about community justice and mediation, here is a blog about a case heard at the Comite de Mediation et Conciliation in Luvungi.

Uvira seems to be a rather anonymous town deep in Central East Africa. The architecture: crumbling. The nightlife: sparse and risky. The inhabitants: unpretentious and lively. The sole attraction: Lake Tanganyika, although all the good beaches are over in Burundi. However, Uvira has a bit of its own dark history and intrigue, despite not having the glamour or mzungu creature comforts of Bukavu, Goma, or Beni.

In the same way, Fizi Territory has cultivated a sort of infamous reputation in the Congo, despite its rather innocuous appearance. Laurent “Mzee” Kabila operated in Fizi Territory, back when he was a Leftist rebel leader in the 1960s/70s. Che Guevara visited this area, back when he lent himself to the revolutionary cause against Mobutu; Che came away totally disillusioned by the state of the revolutionary struggle in this part of Africa that has so often resisted misguided outside attempts at transformation or analysis, of all ideological types.

Monuments in towns and villages all over Fizi Territory memorialize those slaughtered by the brutal RCD during the Second Congo War. However, I have seen no monuments marking the slaughter of the Banyamulenge that occurred in the frenzied anti-Banyamulenge hysteria in the days just before the Rwandan invasion.

In August 1996, when it was clear that the Rwandan government was arming some of the Rwandophone Banyamulenge in the Kivus in preparation for an invasion, the Kivus were swept with a wave of xenophobia. Local politicians poured out rhetoric against the Banyamulenge “traitors”, encouraging jobless and shiftless young men to “attack the Banyamulenge” and seize their assets. In Uvira, many Banyamulenge were kicked out of their houses, beaten, and thrown in jail by angry mobs. All over Fizi Territory, the “autochtone” population rose up to kill Banyamulenge and take their cows. In Bukavu in October, the provincial governor declared the Banyamulenge persona non grata and ordered their expulsion from South Kivu. The xenophobia was not limited to just the Kivus; all over Zaire, persons with “Tutsi” morphology were harassed, beaten, and even murdered.

The slaughter of the Banyamulenge pulled the trigger for the Rwandan invasion of the Congo. Up until then, the RPA had been watching the Hutu refugee camps just over the border in Zaire become rallying points for the former genocidaires, without any international intervention to stop this travesty. The regrouping Interahamwe and FAR had even begun raids back into Rwanda, and the newly installed RPF government could hardly tolerate a cross-border insurgency made up of the perpetrators of the Tutsi genocide. Several other African governments were eager to see Mobutu go, and they saw this as an opportunity to change the leadership in Kinshasa. In addition, the Rwandan military had been recruiting disaffected Banyamulenge youth and giving them arms and military training, in preparation for an invasion. The xenophobic purging of the “Tutsi” Banyamulenge in the Kivus was the final straw. Using an alliance of Zairian rebel leaders (the AFDL) as a front, the Rwandans invaded Zaire.

Uvira, in fact, was the first town to fall to the AFDL and its allies, on October 24, 1996. A mere seven months later, Kabila pere and his kadogos (child soldiers) were marching on Kinshasa. By mid-1997, Mzee Kabila was the president of the newly-christened Democratic Republic of Congo.

It is interesting to think about Mzee Kabila returning to South Kivu/Northeastern Katanga, after many corpulent years of being a smuggler in Tanzania. Here, in this eastern region, he fought against Mobutu’s agents from remote mountain camps. Here is where his son Joseph was born, in a village called Mpiki in the view of Mlima ya damu (“Mountain of Blood”). Here was where he trudged along with Che Guevara, among the gnarled trees and manioc fields and jagged piles of rocks. The aging, largely irrelevant rebel, with his Maoist tracts and monochromatic wardrobe of safari jackets, had been made ruler of Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest country, perhaps a few decades too late.

In late 1998, when Kabila decided to thumb his nose at his “minders”, the Rwandans quickly put together a new rebel movement based in the east to challenge Kabila’s authority, the RCD. Thus, the Second Congo War had begun; today, mentioning this war to most Uvirois will cause them to wrinkle their brow and sigh. While many Kivutians saw the AFDL invasion as a war of “liberation” from Mobutu’s tri-decade dictatorship, the rule of the RCD is remembered with sorrow and chagrin. The RCD soldiers were mostly Rwandans or Congolese Rwandophones (such as the Banyamulenge), and in South Kivu they did not easily forget the anti-Banyamulenge pogroms committed by the “autochtone” Congolese. Now, the Banyamulenge were in charge, and they were looking to subdue the population by violent means. In Fizi Territory, the RCD committed horrid massacres in villages such as Makobola, slaughtering hundreds of civilians at a time. When I ask Congolese people my age about what life was like in Uvira/Fizi during the RCD-era, the reply I get most often is “Well, we just survived”.

In the days since the end of the Second Congo War, Uvira/Fizi has been one of the sites of the ongoing struggle between state-sanctioned armed forces (the FARDC) and the remaining non-state armed groups (in Uvira/Fizi, the FDLR, FRF, FNL, and various Mai Mai groups). Occasionally, events here make small waves in foreign journals, but sadly mostly related to tragedy and continuing human rights abuses committed by armed groups.

And thus, events that occurred in Uvira and Fizi Territory have been extremely pivotal in Congo’s recent history. The easygoing nature of Uvirois makes it easy to forget how much the region has been through, and in a way it is a bit encouraging that there are very strong efforts at ethnic conflict transformation going on in Uvira/Fizi.

Nonetheless, the Dark Side does persist. Anti-Rwandan sentiment can still be fairly strong here in Uvira/Fizi (just like xenophobic anti-Congolese sentiment can be fairly strong across the border in Rwanda). In this area, many Congolese people hate Joseph Kabila because he “made a deal” with the Rwandans to end the Second Congo War, and political discussions with Uvirois often result in absurd statements about a “double genocide” and about Joseph Kabila being a Rwandan puppet. Down in Fizi Territory especially, the tendency seems to be to blame outsiders for all the problems, whether it be Rwanda, Belgium, the United States, or even just Congolese from other parts of the country. This may explain a lot of the success of Mai Mai Yakutumba; despite their documented violations of human rights, they remain strongly tied to the community of Babembe political elites in Fizi.

For an outsider like myself who is relatively new to the Kivus, the simmering ethnic/political/class tensions may seem silly and superficial, and very often we non-Africans try to make what Jason Stearns calls “simplistic solutions to complex problems”. However, there are years of economic decay, local power struggles, political manipulation, warfare, colonial social restructuring, and oblivious international involvement that have formed the image of what we see in this particular section of South Kivu today.

I have always found it a bit interesting the independent nature and identity of Uvira and Fizi, even within South Kivu. The two territories are also very different from each other, most starkly when it comes to ethnic makeup and topography. In Fizi, the Babembe are dominant. In Uvira, it is much more diverse, with Bafulero, Bashi, and Bavira. In terms of geography, Uvira has the great Rusizi Plain, which borders with Burundi, whereas Fizi has massive forests high in the hills. The Rusizi looks like something straight out of The Lion King, a broad and burnt-red stretch of savannah where cows roam free. For sure, I have always preferred Uvira to, say Bukavu, the sophisticated (if rather pretentious) provincial capital of South Kivu.

Each part of the Congo has had a different story; in northern Congo in Ituri and Equateur, the story includes the MLC and fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan troops over Congolese territory and resources. In Katanga and Kasai, the story is of the large-scale exploitation of minerals such as gold, diamonds, and copper. In Kinshasa, the story includes bizarre tales of nuclear reactors built by priests, spectacular examples of corruption, and the fast-fading majesty of what used to be one of the most exciting cities in Africa. All over the Congo, there are stories, all interlinked at some point, but all possessing an individual spirit. Point being, the Congo is very big, but it is still fascinating at how events starting in somewhere like Uvira can change the course of history for the behemoth of Central Africa.

I know Uvira by its labyrinth-like markets (Mulongwe, Kalmabenge), the hordes of moto-taxis clogging the main road, the signs with the various NGO acronyms (AVSI, AJID, PSVS, SOFIBEF, 8eme CEPAC), the quick geographic orientation of the rising hill on one side and the turquoise lake to the other, the piles of fetid garbage that line the streets, the crowds of boys smacking their lips and croaking “goomawneng” (good morning) to get my attention, the ravines and vine-covered cemeteries, the crates of Primus bottles outside the Depot Bralima, the colorful pagne dresses and oddly-tailored western-style suits, the huffing Mitsubishi flatbed trucks, the groups of money-changers sitting under umbrellas, the trucks full of green-clad soldiers wielding Norinco 56s and RPGs, the women rolling chapatti next to a crackling pan of oil under the shade of a tree, the thumping of manioc leaves being crushed in a pestle, each bridge and river and ronde-point. I know Fizi Territory mostly by just the utter sense of remoteness it inspires whenever I visit. This is my home in the Congo.

Here is a link to the NY Times article on a study soon to be published by the American Journal of Public Health on the prevalence of rape in the DRC:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/world/africa/12congo.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss

On March 31^st, an attack on civilians occurred in the village of Kikoze, in the Haut Plateau of Uvira Territory.  The perpetrators were integrated ex-FRF units of the FARDC, stationed nearby.  A number of women in Kikoze were raped, and on April 5^th, 9 survivors arrived in Uvira town to seek assistance and report the incident.  PSVS lodged the women and gave them first-response psychological care, while Arche d’Alliance collected the information regarding the attack for legal and human rights action.  PSVS also facilitated medical treatment for the women at the hospital in Uvira, with direct financial support from IRC.  Other organizations that provided resources and assistance were AMCAV and CICR.

Kikoze is about a 3-day journey out of Uvira, and most of the journey must be made on foot across difficult terrain.  In the remote areas of the Haut Plateau, monitoring the human rights situation remains difficult because of the lack of access to these areas.

On April 8^th, all the women who had come down from Kikoze started their return journey home.  PSVS gave each woman a pagne and a cooking pot to take back home with her.

On the same day that the women of Kikoze were sent home, OCHA held its weekly security briefing, and the incident in Kikoze was discussed at length.  One of the concerns brought up at the OCHA meeting was that there still aren’t many transportation resources available for the Haut Plateau and other remote regions of the Eastern Congo.  Remember, it takes days to reach a place like Kikoze by foot, and it is hardly the most remote village in the Haut Plateau.  If a survivor requires immediate and drastic medical treatment, she may not be able to make it a major hospital in time.  In addition, human rights monitors in the Haut Plateau are also sparse, and villages in the hills lack the maisons d’ecoutes that are mostly scattered in towns along heavily populated thoroughfares.

Another alarming concern was brought to light; these women will return to Kikoze with their pagne and cooking pot, but there still remains little protection for them back in their village, or even en route to their homes, traveling on lonely mountain footpaths.  Some of those at the OCHA meeting expressed concern that the women were being sent home unaccompanied.  Indeed, even if they return home safely, they may risk being re-violated or even killed, since they dared seek help outside of their community and shared the details of the incident with human rights monitors.  The same FARDC unit is presumably still near Kikoze, with the violators in its ranks.  Were these women being sent to their doom after being already violated, with only a pagne and a cooking pot to show for it?

Again, an unfortunate symptom of the problem of sexual violence in the Kivus and the response from the NGO community: women are often left vulnerable after seeking assistance from humanitarian organizations.  Granted, protection from the FARDC is a responsibility that lies with the Congolese government, and they deserve criticism for failing to curb the depraved and violent behavior of their own soldiers.

Whether it is from the lack of resources to surmount the many obstacles, or from the lack of will to follow through, local and international organizations are failing to provide sufficient care and protection for many survivors.  Sometimes, the lack of creative thinking or recognition of these problems seem to defy common sense, and gives the appearance of apathy.  Much of what I heard at the OCHA meeting was a bit stultifying, although I don’t doubt there are many individuals and groups who are hard at work to assist survivors of sexual violence.   However, SOS FED, which is a tiny organization compared to a lot of the big-hitter NGOs in Uvira, appears to provide its beneficiaries with much better care than what was given to the survivors from Kikoze.

Women leaving our centers are accompanied back home by reintegration officers, who meet with community leaders to make sure that the reintegrating woman’s rights will be respected upon her return.  Currently, SOS FED’s two reintegration officers in Kazimia and Kikonde are accompanying women returning to the Ubwari Peninsula, the site of ongoing combat between the FARDC, FDLR, and Mai Mai.

In addition, women leaving our centers receive a small cash stipend to help them in starting over again in their community.  This is in addition to whatever income they gained at the SOS FED center from practicing communal cultivation.

Personally, I question how much psychological recovery survivors can gain in 3 days, especially considering the devastating psychosocial consequences of rape in Eastern Congo.  This is why we never send women home after 3 days with a pagne and a cooking pot.  However, SOS FED is still a small organization with limited resources confronting an enormous problem.  I believe the difference is that SOS FED’s model is highly replicable and yet still very effective.  SOS Fed’s model has an emphasis on wholly treating the outcomes of rape, including the social, psychological, and economic effects.  For what we cannot do ourselves, we seek partnerships with organizations like Arche d’Alliance to provide more complete assistance to our beneficiaries.

PSVS still does a pretty good job, and this is not meant to be a critique of PSVS or their financiers at IRC.  Nonetheless, perhaps the humanitarian community as a whole needs to look at the models by which they assist the women of South Kivu, and ask themselves if they are really as effective and efficient as they can be.  So far, no one is scrambling to replicate the SOS FED model, and SOS FED is still spending a lot less than what a lot of local NGOs here receive from international financiers.

The nine survivors from Kikoze demonstrated courage by making a dangerous journey to Uvira to seek assistance, denounce the perpetrators, and then return to their village.  Next week, MONUSCO is supposed to be sending a mission to Kikoze to investigate the incident.  The survivors who made their way to Uvira indicated that there are probably more women who were raped by the FARDC in the Kikoze area.  And we are only a little over three months into the year…

Good news: the German Embassy in Kigali gave Marceline her Schengen visa, so she will be departing for Berlin this Saturday. However, the entire ordeal was quite exhausting: traveling from Uvira to Kigali takes an entire day, and Marceline does not enjoy long bus trips. Hopefully next time we can find an easier way to do the entire thing.

The German Embassy in Kigali coordinated the visa approval with the German Embassy in Kinshasa, and they were very friendly and helpful when we came to pick it up. Our gratitude goes to the staff at both embassies, as well as our partners at ifa-Zivik for contacting them and requesting that Kigali accept Marceline’s application.

An interesting story: when we were at the bus station in Kigali, waiting for the bus to Kamembe, a young man approached me and struck up a conversation. His name was Philosophe, and he spoke fairly decent English. We started talking about music, and he told me about American artists that he liked: 50 Cent, Ne-Yo, and Chris Brown. Chris Brown, Philosophe told me, was the most popular American singer in Rwanda. I told Philosophe that I did not like Chris Brown because he beat up his girlfriend, Rihanna. Chris Brown’s popularity in America has declined quite a bit because of his violent behavior towards his girlfriend, I explained. I asked if he had heard about Chris Brown hitting Rihanna, he said yes. I asked Philosophe if this had affected his opinion of Chris Brown, he said no. I told him I thought that violence towards women should not be tolerated.

“Ah, but hitting your girl is a necessary part of the relationship, to keep them in line,” said Philosophe.

Oh my.

Bus station in Kigali

Bus station in Kigali

South Kivu is home to quite a few ethnic groups, and with any area with fragmented identities, there are low-level tensions between these groups.  In Uvira and Fizi, there are many different tribal/linguistic groups, such as the Bafulero, Babembe, Bavira, Banyamulenge, Bashi.  Here is a little guide to the prefixes:

One person: Mufulero

Many people: Bafulero

Language: Kifulero

For example:  Josephine is a Mubembe.  She belongs to the Babembe people, and she speaks Kibembe.  There are a couple of exceptions to these grammatical rules; for example, the Banyamulenge speak Kinyarwanda, as their ethnic group came to the Kivus from Rwanda a few hundred years ago.  People from Rwanda are called Banyarwanda, people from Burundi are called Barundi (or, more commonly, burundais) and speak Kirundi.  In the Kivus, most everybody knows Kiswahili, as is the case in Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, and Tanzania.  Kiswahili has become the lingua franca in areas where people from many different ethnic groups are found, such as Uvira town.  In addition, most people know at least a little bit of the language of other ethnic groups.  Despite slight regional differences in vocabulary, one can get most anywhere in East Africa if one speaks Kiswahili.

One has to be extremely careful when talking about ethnicity, especially when it comes to the various armed groups.  Ethnic issues oftentimes are connected to political and military actions, but no armed group’s motivations can be explained entirely along ethnic guidelines.  Looking for a political motive is more worthwhile.

When the Rwandans invaded the Congo and continued to have a presence in the Kivus, part of their explanation for their invasion was to prevent the “genocide” of their “Tutsi” brothers, the Banyamulenge.  Simmering ethnic tensions already existing between the Banyamulenge and the “autochtone” tribes (Babembe, Bafulero) were one of the reasons why South Kivu was invaded, catalyzed by the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda and by the fact many of the perpetrators fled into the Congo and were regrouping there.  Depending on whom you talk to here, you will always get a different response as to who is the truly “victimized” ethnic group in South Kivu.  While political and rebel movements may be along “tribal” lines (the FDLR, for example, is a “Hutu” nationalist group), ethnicity may be simply be an excuse to further a selfish agenda. Politicians and military leaders exploit these differences; in South Kivu, the Banyamulenge can be portrayed either as bloodthirsty killers of the “native” tribes or as victims of “genocidal Congolese” and their “Hutu genocidaire allies”.  Neither portrayal is correct. Members of one ethnic group may be quick to recall the massacres of their tribesmen at the hands of another tribe, but won’t be able to recall the massacres committed by their own ethnic group against others; I’ve heard this quite a bit from Bembe people in Fizi Territory, who are quick to point out sites where Babembe were massacred by the predominately Banyamulenge RCD, but would be hard pressed to recount the anti-Banyamulenge pogroms/massacres that have also occurred in the area, before and after the RCD takeover.

Of course, this is not to say that ethnicity/tribal affiliation is something to ignore; one only has to look at the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to see the perils of ignoring ethnic tensions and how they can be exploited for murderous intent.  Ethnic divides can ignite hatred and suspicion, since it is that much easier to hate the “other” who doesn’t speak your language, looks a little differently than you, and practices customs slightly different from yours.

The FARDC in South Kivu consist of many Banyamulenge, including quite of the officers.  The Mai Mai are comprised of members mostly from the “autochtone” tribes, the Babembe, Bafulero, etc.  The fact that the conflict is delineated along ethnic lines is one reason why the Amani Leo troops are implicated in so many rapes in Fizi Territory; there is a lower mental/cultural threshold to cross for a Banyamulenge soldier to rape/assault someone of the “other” ethnic group, especially for someone they see as the “enemy”.  Same thing goes for the FDLR rebels and their general attitude towards the Congolese population.  The Banyamulenge are not inherently evil, and not all members of their ethnic group can be labeled as rapists and murderers, despite what some members of some other ethnic groups may tell you.  It is easy to see how the situation could be reversed if the FARDC ranks were mostly commanded and made up of members of another ethnic group.

This is not to say that all sexual or gender-based violence goes perpendicular to ethnic lines.  The second-class status of women in a patriarchal society make Congolese women all the more vulnerable to the designs of all predators, be they a soldier from a different region, their next-door neighbor, or even a member of their own family.  Taboos on denouncing perpetrators and the lack of a functioning law enforcement/justice system make the situation all the more difficult to gauge and ameliorate.

When I write about the Congo, I mostly try to avoid attaching ethnic labels to political/armed groups, except when necessary to possibly explain the reasons around a group’s actions/platform.  The point is that ethnic/tribal divides often exacerbate conflicts over land, mineral mines, or even cows.  Ignoring them only perpetuates ignorance, but simply attributing all the violence to “ethnic conflict” misses the point.  The war has political, economic, and military implications that extend beyond the region and even beyond the continent.

In the States, I’ve had to endure listening to many an American talking about “crazy uncivilized Africans” killing each other because of “tribal animosity” that existed “long before we [white people] got there”.  I greatly resent this sort of sentiment, mostly because of colonial legacy (remember, it was Europeans who created the whole “Hutu” and “Tutsi” false dichotomy) and the modern problems of Africa that have more to do with economics and politics than tribal affiliation.  Oftentimes these modern problems involve the actions of governments, corporations, and individuals outside of Africa.  I’d say that our culpability as Non-Africans is pretty well established.

It should be noted that the grand majority of Congolese people I know are fairly chilled out when it comes to ethnic differences; people from all different tribes and ethnic groups interact with each other everyday in the Congo without incident.

Many civil society organizations in Eastern Congo work to try and break down these ethnic barriers, reminding everyone that they are Congolese citizens first and foremost, and tribal differences should not be an excuse for violence, mistrust, and marginalization.  SOS FED makes no distinction between beneficiaries in terms of language or tribe, and all are welcome.

Today Amisi, Marceline, and I are getting together a list of supplies we will be sending down to the centers in Mboko and Kikonde. This list includes basic necessities such as rice, beans, cooking oil, and soap. Thanks to these staples, survivors of sexual violence can take time to recover in the physical and mental safety of the centers.
Despite the fact that women provide the economic backbone of the Congo, it is horrifying to think that many are barely able to sustain themselves and their children. This is particularly tragic in the case of rape survivors. Rape carries a strong social stigma for women in Congo, and therefore the consequences in such socially centered communities are devastating. Women who are raped are often rejected by their communities, and even by their families. Some women at the centers will tell you about their husbands kicking them out of the house after they were raped. These women are falsely labeled as “prostitutes”, and because of the social stigma, they are often unable to participate economically in their community. Some of these women end up becoming prostitutes, as being already labeled as such means that it may be the only economic option available. Thus, what does a woman do to provide for herself and her children? She may end up selling her body, even after it has been ravaged against her will.

Of course, prostitution is widely available throughout this part of East Africa, especially since men don’t really have to worry about any social consequences for their sexual behavior. Abortion? Forget it, a woman can be thrown in jail for even saying she wants an abortion. Contraceptives? Only if the man agrees to it. A saying among a lot of men around here is that “you can’t taste the lollipop without removing the wrapper”. Translation: condoms are for suckers.

In this war-torn and politically unstable region, it has been an all-out war on women’s bodies, both in the form of rape and in economic terms as well. The message seems pretty clear: a woman’s body does not belong to herself, but instead to the man with the gun or the man with the fat pocketbook. The total breakdown of law and order and the nature of the war allow for this culture to germinate, as it would happen anywhere in the world under similar circumstances. Honestly, there is nothing more infuriating about working in the Congo than having to think about these realities.

This is why the SOS FED centers are so vital to building peace and equality. Women can recover without starving or selling their bodies. They can cultivate communally, harvesting produce in tranquil fields among others who have shared their experiences. They will have an income, through which they can buy soap and cooking oil themselves, and send their children to school. These women can return to their communities through interventions from the reintegration staff; they will tell their community leaders that these women should not be shunned.

Soap, rice, beans, cooking oil. We will pack it onto a big fuso (transport truck) and send it down into Fizi. When the harvest for beans and manioc occurs, we will get a fuso to bring the produce up to Uvira so the women can sell it at a higher price. The women of the Congo endure.

Congolese women in Baraka, Fizi Territory

Congolese women in Baraka, Fizi Territory

A fight breaks out in a bar in the dark of the night in the town of Fizi, deep in the territory that bears the same name. The argument is between a civilian and a soldier of the 43rd Sector, over a woman. In the resulting melee, the soldier shoots the civilian. This sets off a riot, and an angry crowd lynches the soldier in public.

News of the lynching reaches the troops of the 43rd Sector. To “avenge” their fallen comrade, a group of soldiers descended upon Fizi for a massive campaign of rape and destruction. So far, 50 cases have been confirmed, but as more people return the official number is expected to climb. The real number is probably much higher, since many women will not report that they have been violated.

The 43rd Sector is part of Amani Leo (“Peace Now”), a military operation charged with dealing once and for all with the marauding FDLR rebels who continue to ravage the Kivus. Their commander, Lt. Colonel Kibibi Mutware is a former CNDP rebel who was integrated into the FARDC as the result of a 2009 peace agreement. He commands a group of Kinyarwanda-speaking Banyamulenge troops, often resented because of the role of their ethnic group in the Rwandan invasion of Eastern Congo.
Lt. Col. Kibibi claims that the perpetrators of this mass rape were soldiers disobeying orders to stay on base. However, as the people of Fizi recounted the horror they survived, it became clear that more than a few witnessed Lt. Col. Kibibi urging his soldiers to attack the people of Fizi, directing them in committing unspeakable acts of violence. These accusations were serious enough to be included in a UN report on the Fizi mass rape. Also, it is not the first time that Lt. Col. Kibibi has been accused of human rights abuses.

It is a well-documented phenomenon when FARDC military commanders spur their troops to ravage the very citizens they are sworn to protect, and the latest incident in Fizi is quite possibly another instance of such a sickening perversion.

MONUSCO troops now patrol Fizi town in order to maintain order, and a Congolese military spokesman has stated that all who were responsible for the carnage have been arrested. The Congolese military supposedly has a “zero-tolerance” policy towards human rights abuses, and yet it begs the question why something this massive and atrocious occurred in the first place.

The general apathy of the Congolese government and the international community towards human rights abuses committed by the FARDC is bearing bitter fruit. Human rights training, reprimands, and the removal of some commanders who condone rape have not been extensive enough to cut away the cancer that plagues the Congolese military. Amani Leo is quickly becoming a joke at the expense of the people of Eastern Congo.

When does this end?

Kitagi miyazi, rafiki yangu.  So, I am headed back to the Congo.  After three months of documenting and reporting on the work of several civil society organizations, I left Uvira in August 2009 with a bad case of dysentery.  However, the violence and oppression in Eastern Congo has never been far from my mind.  I have tried to keep track of the human rights situation in the region, and now I am presented with the opportunity to work with SOS Femmes en Danger, a courageous local NGO based in South Kivu province that assists survivors of sexual violence.  Over the summer of 2009 Ned Meerdink and I produced a mini-documentary that showed the importance of SOS FED’s work.  Now, The Advocacy Project, SOS FED, and Zivik are embarking on an ambitious risk-reduction campaign, helping women decrease the probability of attack and enslavement.  Ned Meerdink has been laying down the groundwork for this project for months, and now I will be switching spots with him for about 12 months or so.

Here are some news articles and reports that give some background on the current situation in the Congo:

-UN peacekeepers ‘failed’ DR Congo rape victims

BBC News article on Atul Khare’s report to the UN Security Council on shortcomings of UN peacekeepers in preventing sexual violence committed by the FDLR, highlighted by the August 2010 mass rape in Luvungi.

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