Well, it is Election Day Plus One in the Congo.

Acting on the advice of the UNDSS and several others, I have left the Congo and will be finishing up things in Bujumbura, Burundi, before leaving Africa.  I really wish I could have stayed in the DR Congo as an election observer, but for a simple humanitarian, it was the best decision to sit things out.  Maybe I will be back for the next presidential election.

Across the country, polling has been marred by violence and accusations of fraud, but fortunately I am hearing nothing out of Uvira so far.  No news is good news.  However, there are reports that large parts of Fizi Territory did not receive election materials as of yesterday, which makes sense, considering how large parts of Fizi are still zones of combat.

In Lubumbashi, there are reports of up to a dozen or so people killed when armed men opened fire on several polling stations.

In Kinshasa, the Election Day mood was “tense”, as the governor decided to cancel all demonstrations on the last day of campaigning.  This infuriated many UDPS supporters; there were several violent clashes between the police and Tshisekedi supporters.  The EU condemned the cancellation as a violation of free speech and free assembly.

The allegations of voting fraud have mostly been about the following: ballots where Joseph Kabila’s name has already been checked, ballot boxes being already half-full even before the polls opened, poll stations opening late or not opening at all, observers not being allowed to monitor polling stations and inspect ballot boxes, voters not finding their names on the registration lists, soldiers blocking access to polling stations or forcing people to vote their way, and tampering with ballot boxes after they had been collected.  In some cases, accusations of fraud have lead to polling stations being attacked by angry mobs in North Kivu and the Kasai Provinces.  The irregularities are occurring in many places across the whole of the country, according to one observer.

According to the BBC (see below), voting has been extended in some areas, due to polling stations opening late and ballots not arriving.  In one part of Kinshasa, the legislative ballots were a staggering 13 pages long; the amount of resources needed to put on this election at rather short notice has been overwhelming.  In particular, there are concerns about how accessible rural polling stations have been in a country with so few roads.

Checking the latest headlines, both the CENI (Congolese electoral commission) and UN envoy Roger Meece are so far satisfied with the way elections are going.  Whether this is the opinion of the man (or woman) on the street, however, is another matter.  Nonetheless, I think everyone knew going into Election Day that things would be rough, and fortunately so far it has not been as bad as it could have been, considering historical precedence.  However, we all know that Congo (or any country, for that matter) deserves better.

To keep up-to-date on what exactly is going on in these perilous days for the Congo, I would advise you to visit the following websites:

Radio Okapi

Probably the best news source on anything in the Congo.  Check out the nifty, interactive election map, which gives population data, number of candidates, etc., on each province.

Congo Siasa

Jason Stearns is in Bukavu right now as an election observer, and he has lots of interesting updates from around the country.

BBC News: DR Congo voting extended in some areas

The latest BBC news on what’s going on with elections.  Make sure to check out the cool series of maps at the bottom.

Charlie Walker

Ms. Walker has just written blog entry on a series of tragic incidents that happened in Uvira just before we left, and what some of the women of Uvira have done to respond.

In 2006, the Democratic Republic of Congo held its first multiparty elections in 46 years. At the time, the Congo was emerging from many years of war, involving all of its neighbors and other African nations. There was a fragile peace, or, in the case of the Kivus, none at all.

The 2006 election was largely financed by international donors, who accounted for 90% of the financial burden. In addition, MONUC, UNDP, and other international agencies provided much-needed oversight and guidance. After all, this was a country that had just been recently reunited through a weak peace agreement, and many of the major players still had armed groups at their disposal.

Now, the situation is quite different, as Joseph Kabila and the rest of the government represent a much stronger, democratically-elected Democratic Republic of Congo. Things may still be bad, but they are still better from the cauldron of chaos of the late 90s/early 2000s. However, there are still signs of trouble.

One particularly eyebrow-raising development of 2011 election process has been the recent changes to the Congolese constitution, which, among other things, has altered the presidential election system from a 2-round, majority-wins election to a 1-round, plurality-wins election.

When the Congolese National Assembly and Senate passed these controversial amendments, there were immediately allegations of bribery against President Kabila. A 1-round plurality-wins election would make things easier for Kabila to divide the opposition and win with a much smaller percentage of the national vote. In addition, it appeared suspicious that these amendments were passed so quickly through the Congolese legislature, given its reputation as a body that usually works grindingly slow. While there is nothing inherently wrong with a single-round election (or with the changes to the constitution, if indeed there was no bribery), the problem is that it appears to have occurred only to the benefit of Kabila. The sole argument, it seems, for the public benefit of these electoral changes is that it will save money for the Congolese state, which is now carrying 60% of the cost of the election.

A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) released back in May gives a rather pessimistic image of the 2011 elections: opposition supporters and journalists are being harassed and beaten during demonstrations, there is a considerable lack of much-needed international involvement, the CENI (the national electoral commission) is politically biased, there is not enough election security, and the proposed November 28th election date is too soon to organize a free-and-fair election. However, if the date of the election is pushed back, there is sure to be controversy, as Kabila’s term expires on December 7th by constitutional mandate. There are already rumors that members of the opposition (notably Etienne Tshisekedi) are planning on demanding a power-sharing agreement if there is no clear winner by the date on which Kabila’s term ends.

So, what is going on here in Uvira? All over town, posters are plastered onto walls and kiosks, and men on foot or bicycles are advertising for various candidates via megaphone. Things are calm so far.

More news from Uvira/Fizi:

On 10/24, Mai Mai rebels attacked a FARDC position in the village of Kabumbe, next to the village of Mukwesi.  In the attack, 4 civilians were killed and 3 injured, and the FARDC suffered 2 dead and 2 injured.  Kabumbe/Mukwesi is about 2 hours south of Uvira, close to the town of Mboko.  The attackers allegedly belonged to Mai Mai Pascal, an armed group loyal to Pascal Bwasakala, a former protégé of Yakutumba.  The day after the Mai Mai attack, FARDC troops arrived to reinforce the position.  However, the attack prompted massive IDP movements away from Kabumbe/Mukwesi, leaving the villages virtually empty of inhabitants.  OCHA is cautioning all humanitarian workers passing through the Swima-Mboko area to only travel in vehicle convoys.  Furthermore, OCHA warns that if the situation persists or deteriorates, agencies will be forced to travel with a PAKBATT escort.

There are continuing inter-ethnic tensions in Tulambo and Maranda, two villages in the Massif d’Itombwe, a large forest in the Haut Plateau of Fizi.  Just since 10/21, clashes between the Bembe and Banyamulenge communities have left 4 wounded and 3 dead.  This next week, MONUSCO and several local NGOs are poised to launch a Joint Assessment Mission to the area.

On 10/21, the population of Kahanda, a village in Uvira Territory close to the town of Lemera, fled due to the arrival of Mai Mai Bede, a small band of armed men loyal to ex-FARDC commander Col. Bede Safari.  Col. Bede defected from the FARDC in 2010, and his troops only number in the dozens.  However, his arrival still precipitated a panicked IDP movement of around 64 households.  FARDC troops stationed nearby went to Kahanda to hunt down the Mai Mai Bede, but the rebels were warned in advance and fled before the FARDC arrived.

In addition, there are further reports of violence and insecurity occurring just this week: 2 nurses killed in Buhonde by unidentified armed men, 3 civilians kidnapped in Kalungwe, and a traditional chief shot in the night in Kitundu.  This is all just human-on-human violence; this past week rainy season floods have also destroyed part of the town of Sange, on the Rusizi Plain in Uvira Territory.  The damage includes the destruction of 500 houses, 3 schools, 1 bridge, and several fields.  The casualty toll from the flooding currently sits 5 dead and 2 severely injured.

So, what is the situation in Uvira/Fizi these days?   There are wars and rumors of wars.  With the elections approaching, the activity of armed groups, most notably Mai Mai Yakutumba in the Ubwari Peninsula, has reached its highest level yet in 2011.

Vacillating internal displacement has created a host of humanitarian concerns in/around the Ubwari Peninsula, where the most concentrated fighting has occurred between FARDC forces and the allied Mai Mai Yakutumba/FNL/FDLR rebels.  As rumors of combat sweep through the villages and towns of the Ubwari, civilians will flee before fighting turns up in their locality.  Alternately, IDPs will return home immediately if fighting has ceased or has not occurred in their area.  However, this has created a yo-yo effect, with civilians fleeing and returning home multiple times over the last several months.  In some cases, returning IDPs are crossing paths with fleeing IDPs from their home areas.  An additional concern is that there is not enough of a humanitarian presence in/around the Ubwari to monitor the situation and respond to humanitarian concerns resulting from the back-and-forth IDP movements.

In one of their most recent monitoring reports, Arche d’Alliance reported that between 8/24 and 9/22, approximately 2,375 persons fled to Baraka alone; these IDPs arrived from the Ubwari, as well as from towns such as Kazimia and Sebele.

Since August, battles between FARDC and allied Mai Mai/FNL/FDLR forces have been reported in the following locations: Nemba, Talama, Yungu, Kikonde, Katenga, Sebele, and Karamba.

Due to the large numbers of IDPs fleeing the Ubwari, MONUSCO deployed Egyptian troops to Sebele to set up a TOB (Temporary Operations Base).  However, on October 19^th, MONUSCO recalled the Egyptians, despite the request of the humanitarian community in Fizi Territory to extend the TOB.  According to OCHA sources, civilians in Sebele are now afraid of reprisal due to the lack of a MONUSCO troops presence.

On October 9^th, gunshots were heard in the proximity of Baraka, sending the population into a panic.  For a while, reports were that Mai Mai Yakutumba were fighting the FARDC in the streets of Baraka, and therefore poised to take the most important town in all of Fizi.  However, it was soon revealed that the rumors were false.  Nonetheless, commerce through Baraka remains difficult because of Yakutumba’s presence on Lake Tanganyika, and prices of basic goods are reported to be soaring.

OCHA sources in Baraka report that since the increase in combat (and increase in FARDC fighting forces in their area), there has been a rise in human rights abuses committed by troops against civilians.  Monitors have cited multiple incidents of arbitrary arrests, extortion, and general harassment.  One must remember that there is quite a bit of mutual distrust and suspicion between the FARDC troops, many of which are not from Fizi, and the local population.

An interesting effect of the rising (and continuing) violence and warfare is that Congolese refugee repatriations are all but nonexistent in this area.  Since the days of the Congo Wars, people from Uvira/Fizi have fled to neighboring countries, in particular Burundi and Tanzania.  Despite the fact that President Joseph Kabila has claimed that the “fire in the East is only embers”, the news of continuing unrest has reached the ears of refugees, and they are not ready to come back to a region where lives and livelihoods are still at risk.  Another sad aspect of the entire affair is that the Tanzanian government is starting to use coercive methods to “encourage” Congolese refugees in their country to repatriate.

In general, the recent increase in the activity of certain non-state armed groups is very disheartening.  Many of these armed groups, including so-called “local defense leagues”, continue to commit acts of sexual violence and paralyze the economy through extortion and larceny.  Their behavior mirrors the well-documented human rights abuses of the FARDC, many of whom were formerly members of rebel groups themselves.  There is nothing that “new” about these groups; the non-state armed groups, such as the various “Mai Mai” movements, have existed for over 10 years in eastern Congo.  However, possibly the most disturbing aspect about the actions of these non-state armed groups is the excuse that their violent behavior is but a means of political expression, communicating through robbery and rape their dissatisfaction with the Congolese government.  No roads?  No hospitals?  No jobs?  Rape women!  That will get Kabila’s attention!

The current pre-election conditions in Uvira/Fizi are indicative of a number of Congolese problems: the lack of faith in elections and the political system, the continuing impunity of armed groups, the lack of effective security resources, the staggering injustices resulting from deep-seated gender inequality, and the use of violence as a means of political expression.

As the election date grows closer, we hold our breath.  There is not much hope that the outcome of the election will necessarily signal a change for improvements in the Congolese political system, no matter who gets elected, but one wishes that the “Fire in the East” would be extinguished instead of downplayed and ignored.

Vehicle rented by SOS FED that is similar to the Eben-Ezer vehicle that was attacked

Vehicle rented by SOS FED that is similar to the Eben-Ezer vehicle that was attacked

On Tuesday, October 5^th, I awoke to the sounds of wailing coming from outside my house.  I stepped outside to investigate, and was greeted by a crowd of people loudly mourning outside of the office of Eben-Ezer Ministry, right across the street from my residence.  There had been an ambush the night before, and the director of Eben-Ezer, along with several of his staff, had been killed.

Eben-Ezer Ministry is a local faith-based NGO that works primarily in education in Fizi and Uvira Territories.  I have been introduced to several of the members of Eben-Ezer, and would see them across the street and wave to them on a daily basis.

On October 4^th, around 17h, a vehicle belonging to Eben-Ezer Ministry, containing 14 passengers, was ambushed by Mai Mai Yakutumba.  The attack occurred in a remote area known as Echibe, about 18 km from Baraka on the road to Fizi Centre.  In the attack, the Mai Mai allegedly fired an RPG 7 rocket-propelled grenade at the vehicle.  7 people were killed, 5 of them workers for Eben-Ezer.  According to the Territorial Administrator of Fizi, 3 others were wounded by gunfire and 4 women were kidnapped by the assailants.  The survivors of the attack have alleged that among the perpetrators were members of the FNL (a Burundian rebel group exiled in the Congo) and the FDLR (a Rwandan Hutu nationalist group).

The Territorial Administrator also asserted that the FARDC was able to chase down and kill two of the perpetrators responsible for the massacre.

On the same evening, just before the Eben-Ezer ambush, a motorcycle taxi carrying a policeman and a FARDC soldier was attacked nearby.  All three persons were killed.  It is believed that the same armed men who attacked the Eben-Ezer vehicle were also responsible for this incident.

The UN has released a statement condemning the attacks and calling for the Congolese government to do more to protect humanitarians.  During the subsequent days after the attacks, I could hear quite a few UN helicopters going back-and-forth between Uvira and Fizi.  According to the UN press release, there have been approximately 140 reported security incidents involving humanitarian workers in Nord Kivu and Sud Kivu since the beginning of 2011.

The local FARDC commander, Col. Delphin Kahimbi, condemned the Mai Mai for “missing their targets” in attacking civilians.  Col. Kahimbi said that the Mai Mai had the time to verify the object of their “ambush” as being a group of civilians, and therefore have no excuse.  While Col. Kahimbi’s words ring true, his statement is somewhat ironic considering the conduct of the FARDC during Kimiya II and Amani Leo and their own disregard for the rules of engagement.

One stark reality is that there is very little security for anyone traveling in Fizi Territory, especially considering that the MONUSCO troop presence is weak and the FARDC troop presence can be quite ineffective.  Every day, humanitarians, along with the ordinary citizens of Fizi, must risk their lives in order to carry out their work.  This latest incident, though sadly preventable, was probably inevitable, considering the lack of security and the increasing level of combat between armed groups in Fizi Territory.  One wonders if the Congolese government and MONUSCO will start to take things a bit more seriously in terms of taking preventative action, instead of arriving at the scene too late to prevent murder, torture, and rape.

Another sinister dimension to the entire sad affair: there are quite a few people that believe that the Eben-Ezer vehicle was targeted by the Mai Mai because it belonged to a “Banyamulenge” NGO.  In 2011, Mai Mai Yakutumba leadership has released several statements demanding the removal of “Rwandan” (i.e. Rwandophone) troops from South Kivu; Yakutumba has used widespread resentment against abusive Rwandan/Rwandophone troops to build support for his agenda, to the detriment of relations between Congolese Rwandophone communities, such as the Banyamulenge, and the “autochtone” tribes of Babembe, Bafulero, and Bavira.  A prominent Banyamulenge leader, Enock Ruberangabo, has called this attack “ethnic conflict at a local level”.  However, one must remember that as long as armed groups operate with impunity in the Kivus, all civilians, regardless of ethnicity, are at risk of being attacked.

Over the past few days, my neighborhood has been filled with a constant stream of mourners coming to Eben-Ezer Ministry to express their condolences.  The sounds of pained wailing have disappeared, but there is still a heavy spirit of bereavement hanging over the quartier.  The humanitarian community in Uvira/Fizi has suffered a great loss, and we are all reminded of the risks that must be taken in order to assist vulnerable populations, fight for social justice, and struggle for development in the Congo.

Jungle path in Fizi Territory

Jungle path in Fizi Territory

For survivors, the experience of sexual violence causes painful and often chronic physical problems, including (but not limited to) STDs, fistulas, irregular bleeding, and chronic abdominal pain.  However, perhaps an even more distressing outcome of rape in the Congo is the social stigmatization that survivors of sexual violence endure at the hands of their families and communities.  Attitudes towards survivors of sexual violence are quite indicative of the second-class status of women in Congolese society, particularly in underdeveloped, rural areas such as Fizi Territory.

After having suffered from an act of sexual violence, oftentimes a survivor will be banished from her family and derided by her community.  The husband of a survivor may expel her from the home, leaving her without support, kinship, or protection.  A survivor will be labeled (quite erroneously) as the “wife of the soldiers” or a “prostitute”, and openly mocked or shunned.  Thus, the post-rape social ramifications in Fizi Territory are devastating for survivors, especially in a society that places a premium on social interaction.  The shame and rejection may prevent a survivor from participating in income-generating activities (agriculture, commerce), and oftentimes will prevent her from seeking assistance.

SOS FED staff work very hard at encouraging survivors to come to SOS FED for assistance, and work with civil, traditional, and religious authorities to find survivors in the area who need assistance.  Once a survivor has entered a SOS FED center, she can receive group therapy and individual counseling sessions, as well as participate in group income-generating activities that also teach risk-reduction behavior.

However, what happens to a woman once she has completed the 3-month course of assistance provided by SOS FED?  Will she be re-accepted by her family and/or community?  The reintegration process, implemented in 2011, addresses this question.  Each SOS FED center has a male reintegration officer, who acts as an advocate for reintegrating beneficiaries.  Thus far, SOS FED has 3 reintegration officers: Luandja Eca Ricardo (Kikonde), M’Munga Selemane (Kazimia), and Lubunga Wilondja (Mboko).

The reintegration officer is tasked with breaking down the misconceptions about survivors of sexual violence within Congolese society, at least to the point where a survivor is able to rejoin her family and resume her life.  The reintegration meets with the family, in particular the husband, of the soon-to-be reintegrated beneficiary.  The reintegration officer educates the family on the rights of survivors of sexual violence, breaks down the myth that the survivor is to blame for the rape, and tries to convince them to re-accept the survivor back into the family.

The reintegration officer works very closely with the mwami to achieve these goals.  The mwami is a traditional position of authority, also known as the chef coutumiere.  The mwami/chef coutumiere is a hereditary position, passed down from father to son.  A mwami may have a constituency ranging from a village, a quartier, or an entire town.  While having no civil or state authority, traditional authorities are still regarded as important figures in Congolese society.  Ordinary citizens often consult a mwami for counsel on important decisions, the resolution of disputes, or just for simple advice.  State authorities often have to work with the cooperation of the mwami in order to carry out state business.

As a person of authority who is respected by the community, the counsel of a mwami can go a long way in assisting with the integration process.  Before beginning reintegration efforts in a village/town, SOS FED reintegration officers have several meetings with the local mwami to educate them on the principles of reintegration and to gain their support and trust for the reintegration process.  Including the mwami in the reintegration process also helps educate the community at large about the rights of survivors of sexual violence.

SOS FED reintegration officers accompany reintegrating women, often over great distances, to their home villages.  Reintegrating beneficiaries are encouraged to continue the risk-reduction activities they learned at the SOS FED center, as well as disseminate this information among their friends and neighbors.

The success of the reintegration process is quite evident.  According to all three reintegration officers, there has only been one case where a woman was abandoned by her husband after reintegration was carried out.  As of the end of the month of September, 21 beneficiaries have been reintegrated from Kikonde/Kazimia, and 19 beneficiaries have been reintegrated from Mboko.

My next few blog entries will be profiles of several people from in/near Mboko who are involved in the reintegration process: 2 former SOS FED beneficiaries and 2 mwami working closely with SOS FED.

SOS FED beneficiary in Mboko

SOS FED beneficiary in Mboko

Capt. Issokelo Didier, FARDC Magistrate

Capt. Issokelo Didier, FARDC Magistrate

On Thursday, September 1st, I arrived at the military tribunal of Uvira, based on an invitation from the head magistrate, Captain Issokelo Didier. In terms of what I focus on (the fight against sexual violence), there was not too much to learn. However, I found some aspects of the experience to be quite interesting:

-While waiting in the courtroom for the judges to arrive, I struck up a conversation with the three prisoners whose cases were to be heard that day. The three men, decked out in faded orange jumpsuits, were accused of being members of an “insurrectionist movement”, the Mai Mai; these accusations were the basis for their appearance in a military court as opposed to a civilian court. They had all been arrested in December 2009, and they said that this day in court was only the second time they had appeared before a judge since being arrested.

Waiting in court

Waiting in court

-The soldiers assigned to guarding the prisoners were a raggedy, if friendly, group of individuals. I struck up a conversation with a soldier named Jeannot, a miniscule and jocular soldier with several missing front teeth and a battered and dented AK-style assault rifle. I asked Jeannot when he joined the army, and he told me he had first joined as a soldier with the RCD in 1998. I asked him how old he was.

“I was born in 1984,” he said. If what he told me was the truth, this meant he had joined the army when he was fourteen. A year younger than me, and yet Jeannot had already marched as a soldier through 13 years of conflict.

Another soldier, Sergeant Alain, told me that he had joined as a kadogo (child soldier) with Laurent Kabila and the AFDL in 1996; again, he did not look that much older than myself.

I asked the soldiers where they were from. Jeannot told me he was a Mubembe from Fizi Territory. I found many of the soldiers were from Fizi, but there were quite a number from all over the Congo, including Bas-Congo, Nord Kivu, and Katanga. Indeed, this group of soldiers appeared to be the most diverse group of Congolese I had ever seen, from the short Babembe to the towering Katangans. They spoke with each other in an interesting mix of Kiswahili, French, and Lingala. Normally, I do not interact with Congolese soldiers, since under different circumstances they might harass me or worse, but this time it was interesting to see the ordinary FARDC foot soldier “up close”.

Jeannot

Jeannot

-The three military judges were a panel of stern-looking, stern-talking FARDC captains who seemed to speak to the prisoners only in admonishments, alternating between French and Kiswahili. During the court recess, all of them lit up noxious cigarettes, which explained the generally stale, sour odor in the courtroom. When I asked the judges about their qualifications, they simply shrugged their shoulders and said that the military had assigned them to this post.

-All three prisoners had the same lawyer representing them, and after a few opening statements, the lawyer disappeared. After a while, the judges had to call a recess, since the prisoners had no legal representation; since their conviction would carry the death penalty, the judges decided that the trial could proceed no further until the three had a trained jurist present on their behalf. The three prisoners complained that the lawyer was charging them a lot of money ($1500), but doing little work. Since no one of them could afford to hire a lawyer himself, they had pooled their resources to hire one to represent all three of them.

-When I asked Capt. Didier if the death penalty had ever been carried out in Uvira against soldiers convicted of “supporting insurrection”, he shook his head no. He told me that if someone is convicted and sentenced to die, he immediately writes a letter to President Kabila asking for amnesty on behalf of the prisoner.

-According to the new rules set out for FARDC military justice, a FARDC officer can only be tried and convicted by officers of his own rank or greater. Thus, if anyone above Capt. Didier’s rank were being investigated (say, a colonel), a group of higher-ranking judges would have to come down from Bukavu to render a judicial decision in the case.

-Capt. Didier complained quite a bit about the lack of resources allocated to him and his team at the Auditorat. He told me that if an investigator opens a dossier in Shabunda, it may take up to a month for the dossier to arrive in Uvira. I asked if he had pleaded to his superiors for more resources, and he claimed that he had, but to no avail. Capt. Didier also claimed he did not have the resources to hold more military courts or open much-needed parquets in parts of Sud Kivu far away from the tribunal in Uvira. When I look at the dismal state of military justice in Sud Sud Kivu, I wonder about all the resources that numerous organizations (United Nations, European Union, etc) have dedicated to stabilization and security sector reform, and whether any of it is reaching our far-flung corner of the Congo.

Overall, the overwhelming feeling I got from attending this trial was frustration with the Congolese judicial process, both civilian and military. However, it was an eye-opening experience, and I learned quite a bit.

One wonders if the landmark trial and conviction of Col. Kibibi Mutware earlier this year was a start of a new trend or simply an irregular blip in a region fraught with impunity for members of armed groups. Not much of what I saw and heard in my experience with the Uvira Auditorat supported the former. I am willing to give Congolese military justice the benefit of the doubt, but I also believe it is about time both the Congolese government and their international partners take a closer look at what is going on.

If you are interested more in the Congolese justice system, please refer to one of my blogs from 2009, where I visited the Tribunal de la Paix, a court where civil cases are heard. If you want to read about community justice and mediation, here is a blog about a case heard at the Comite de Mediation et Conciliation in Luvungi.

On Tuesday, August 30, I attended the monthly meeting of the Uvira CTLVS (Comite Territoriale de la Lutte contre la Violence Sexuelle). The meeting broke down into the usual litany of complaints about lack of cooperation and initiative, since none of the member organizations in the CTLVS seem to want to work together or share their information with the CTLVS focal points.

At this particular CTLVS meeting, a captain from the FARDC showed up, wearing a crisp green uniform with polished epaulettes and gold braids. This captain was a magistrate, a member of the military justice division (“Auditoirat”) of the FARDC. Most recently, the FARDC military justice wing played a crucial role in convicting Col. Kibibi and his men for the January 1st mass rape in Fizi Centre. Every month, a number of cases are heard at the military court in Uvira, mostly stemming from incidents occurring close to Uvira town. However, in more remote, though well-documented, incidents in Uvira/Fizi (Kikozi, Nyakiele), FARDC military justice has been rather slow in even bringing the accused to trial.

I decided to ask the FARDC magistrate about his job and the history of the Auditoirat. He told me that the military justice wing had existed since 2003, when the modern incarnation of the Congolese military was created; their mandate is to investigate/redress wrongs committed by members of the military, as well as teach discipline and good behavior to the troops. In this part of South Kivu, the central Auditoriat based in Uvira is charged with military justice for the territories of Uvira, Fizi, Mwenga, and Shabunda. All cases are heard before the tribunal in Uvira before a panel of military judges; the magistrate himself serves as a prosecutor/investigator. The parquet performs investigations of infractions, prepares the legal dossiers, and presents the cases before the military tribunal. In June, a permanent military parquet opened in the town of Baraka in Fizi Territory, where several months prior a mobile military court (Audience foraine) had handed down Col. Kibibi’s conviction and sentence. Aside from the parquet in Uvira and the secondary parquet in Baraka, there are only “inspectors” present in Misisi, Kametuga, and Shabunda Centre, making the coverage of military justice fairly poor for a very large area (4 of the biggest territories in South Kivu).

I asked the magistrate if he felt that the FARDC today was a more disciplined body than it was eight years ago; his answer was an emphatic “yes”. I asked if FARDC troops cooperated with him in terms of carrying out justice and promoting good behavior within the ranks. Again, he said yes, but then he qualified his statement by saying “in any family, there is never a lack of disobedient children”.

I brought up the case of Col. Kifaru and his defected men, the alleged perpetrators of the mass rape case in Nyakiele in June, who have since been re-absorbed by the FARDC. At this point, our conversation ground to a halt. When I asked at what stage the Auditoirat was in investigating the strong allegations of rape against Col. Kifaru and his men, the magistrate became vague and elusive.

“We are still investigating,” was all he would say.

When I delicately probed further for details, the magistrate refused to divulge any more information, citing “professional secrets”. Maybe commenting on an ongoing investigation would have been a bit out of line for a magistrate, but all promises of “carrying out justice” disappeared once Nyakiele was brought up. Later, one of my CTLVS contacts told me that since the Congolese government’s stance on Nyakiele is rather clear (“ignore/discredit”), the Auditoirat probably will have no support in bringing the perpetrators to justice.

This kind of foot-dragging has also characterized the response to the Kikozi incident; investigations by the Auditoirat and MONUSCO have identified the commanding officer responsible for the unit implicated in the March mass rape (Major Shaka Nyamusalaba), but despite numerous calls from local NGOs to bring Maj. Shaka to Uvira for trial, no such action has been taken.

At the end of our conversation, the magistrate cordially invited me to attend the military tribunal in Uvira proper later in the week. I am planning on taking up his offer, so stay tuned for more.

Uvira seems to be a rather anonymous town deep in Central East Africa. The architecture: crumbling. The nightlife: sparse and risky. The inhabitants: unpretentious and lively. The sole attraction: Lake Tanganyika, although all the good beaches are over in Burundi. However, Uvira has a bit of its own dark history and intrigue, despite not having the glamour or mzungu creature comforts of Bukavu, Goma, or Beni.

In the same way, Fizi Territory has cultivated a sort of infamous reputation in the Congo, despite its rather innocuous appearance. Laurent “Mzee” Kabila operated in Fizi Territory, back when he was a Leftist rebel leader in the 1960s/70s. Che Guevara visited this area, back when he lent himself to the revolutionary cause against Mobutu; Che came away totally disillusioned by the state of the revolutionary struggle in this part of Africa that has so often resisted misguided outside attempts at transformation or analysis, of all ideological types.

Monuments in towns and villages all over Fizi Territory memorialize those slaughtered by the brutal RCD during the Second Congo War. However, I have seen no monuments marking the slaughter of the Banyamulenge that occurred in the frenzied anti-Banyamulenge hysteria in the days just before the Rwandan invasion.

In August 1996, when it was clear that the Rwandan government was arming some of the Rwandophone Banyamulenge in the Kivus in preparation for an invasion, the Kivus were swept with a wave of xenophobia. Local politicians poured out rhetoric against the Banyamulenge “traitors”, encouraging jobless and shiftless young men to “attack the Banyamulenge” and seize their assets. In Uvira, many Banyamulenge were kicked out of their houses, beaten, and thrown in jail by angry mobs. All over Fizi Territory, the “autochtone” population rose up to kill Banyamulenge and take their cows. In Bukavu in October, the provincial governor declared the Banyamulenge persona non grata and ordered their expulsion from South Kivu. The xenophobia was not limited to just the Kivus; all over Zaire, persons with “Tutsi” morphology were harassed, beaten, and even murdered.

The slaughter of the Banyamulenge pulled the trigger for the Rwandan invasion of the Congo. Up until then, the RPA had been watching the Hutu refugee camps just over the border in Zaire become rallying points for the former genocidaires, without any international intervention to stop this travesty. The regrouping Interahamwe and FAR had even begun raids back into Rwanda, and the newly installed RPF government could hardly tolerate a cross-border insurgency made up of the perpetrators of the Tutsi genocide. Several other African governments were eager to see Mobutu go, and they saw this as an opportunity to change the leadership in Kinshasa. In addition, the Rwandan military had been recruiting disaffected Banyamulenge youth and giving them arms and military training, in preparation for an invasion. The xenophobic purging of the “Tutsi” Banyamulenge in the Kivus was the final straw. Using an alliance of Zairian rebel leaders (the AFDL) as a front, the Rwandans invaded Zaire.

Uvira, in fact, was the first town to fall to the AFDL and its allies, on October 24, 1996. A mere seven months later, Kabila pere and his kadogos (child soldiers) were marching on Kinshasa. By mid-1997, Mzee Kabila was the president of the newly-christened Democratic Republic of Congo.

It is interesting to think about Mzee Kabila returning to South Kivu/Northeastern Katanga, after many corpulent years of being a smuggler in Tanzania. Here, in this eastern region, he fought against Mobutu’s agents from remote mountain camps. Here is where his son Joseph was born, in a village called Mpiki in the view of Mlima ya damu (“Mountain of Blood”). Here was where he trudged along with Che Guevara, among the gnarled trees and manioc fields and jagged piles of rocks. The aging, largely irrelevant rebel, with his Maoist tracts and monochromatic wardrobe of safari jackets, had been made ruler of Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest country, perhaps a few decades too late.

In late 1998, when Kabila decided to thumb his nose at his “minders”, the Rwandans quickly put together a new rebel movement based in the east to challenge Kabila’s authority, the RCD. Thus, the Second Congo War had begun; today, mentioning this war to most Uvirois will cause them to wrinkle their brow and sigh. While many Kivutians saw the AFDL invasion as a war of “liberation” from Mobutu’s tri-decade dictatorship, the rule of the RCD is remembered with sorrow and chagrin. The RCD soldiers were mostly Rwandans or Congolese Rwandophones (such as the Banyamulenge), and in South Kivu they did not easily forget the anti-Banyamulenge pogroms committed by the “autochtone” Congolese. Now, the Banyamulenge were in charge, and they were looking to subdue the population by violent means. In Fizi Territory, the RCD committed horrid massacres in villages such as Makobola, slaughtering hundreds of civilians at a time. When I ask Congolese people my age about what life was like in Uvira/Fizi during the RCD-era, the reply I get most often is “Well, we just survived”.

In the days since the end of the Second Congo War, Uvira/Fizi has been one of the sites of the ongoing struggle between state-sanctioned armed forces (the FARDC) and the remaining non-state armed groups (in Uvira/Fizi, the FDLR, FRF, FNL, and various Mai Mai groups). Occasionally, events here make small waves in foreign journals, but sadly mostly related to tragedy and continuing human rights abuses committed by armed groups.

And thus, events that occurred in Uvira and Fizi Territory have been extremely pivotal in Congo’s recent history. The easygoing nature of Uvirois makes it easy to forget how much the region has been through, and in a way it is a bit encouraging that there are very strong efforts at ethnic conflict transformation going on in Uvira/Fizi.

Nonetheless, the Dark Side does persist. Anti-Rwandan sentiment can still be fairly strong here in Uvira/Fizi (just like xenophobic anti-Congolese sentiment can be fairly strong across the border in Rwanda). In this area, many Congolese people hate Joseph Kabila because he “made a deal” with the Rwandans to end the Second Congo War, and political discussions with Uvirois often result in absurd statements about a “double genocide” and about Joseph Kabila being a Rwandan puppet. Down in Fizi Territory especially, the tendency seems to be to blame outsiders for all the problems, whether it be Rwanda, Belgium, the United States, or even just Congolese from other parts of the country. This may explain a lot of the success of Mai Mai Yakutumba; despite their documented violations of human rights, they remain strongly tied to the community of Babembe political elites in Fizi.

For an outsider like myself who is relatively new to the Kivus, the simmering ethnic/political/class tensions may seem silly and superficial, and very often we non-Africans try to make what Jason Stearns calls “simplistic solutions to complex problems”. However, there are years of economic decay, local power struggles, political manipulation, warfare, colonial social restructuring, and oblivious international involvement that have formed the image of what we see in this particular section of South Kivu today.

I have always found it a bit interesting the independent nature and identity of Uvira and Fizi, even within South Kivu. The two territories are also very different from each other, most starkly when it comes to ethnic makeup and topography. In Fizi, the Babembe are dominant. In Uvira, it is much more diverse, with Bafulero, Bashi, and Bavira. In terms of geography, Uvira has the great Rusizi Plain, which borders with Burundi, whereas Fizi has massive forests high in the hills. The Rusizi looks like something straight out of The Lion King, a broad and burnt-red stretch of savannah where cows roam free. For sure, I have always preferred Uvira to, say Bukavu, the sophisticated (if rather pretentious) provincial capital of South Kivu.

Each part of the Congo has had a different story; in northern Congo in Ituri and Equateur, the story includes the MLC and fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan troops over Congolese territory and resources. In Katanga and Kasai, the story is of the large-scale exploitation of minerals such as gold, diamonds, and copper. In Kinshasa, the story includes bizarre tales of nuclear reactors built by priests, spectacular examples of corruption, and the fast-fading majesty of what used to be one of the most exciting cities in Africa. All over the Congo, there are stories, all interlinked at some point, but all possessing an individual spirit. Point being, the Congo is very big, but it is still fascinating at how events starting in somewhere like Uvira can change the course of history for the behemoth of Central Africa.

I know Uvira by its labyrinth-like markets (Mulongwe, Kalmabenge), the hordes of moto-taxis clogging the main road, the signs with the various NGO acronyms (AVSI, AJID, PSVS, SOFIBEF, 8eme CEPAC), the quick geographic orientation of the rising hill on one side and the turquoise lake to the other, the piles of fetid garbage that line the streets, the crowds of boys smacking their lips and croaking “goomawneng” (good morning) to get my attention, the ravines and vine-covered cemeteries, the crates of Primus bottles outside the Depot Bralima, the colorful pagne dresses and oddly-tailored western-style suits, the huffing Mitsubishi flatbed trucks, the groups of money-changers sitting under umbrellas, the trucks full of green-clad soldiers wielding Norinco 56s and RPGs, the women rolling chapatti next to a crackling pan of oil under the shade of a tree, the thumping of manioc leaves being crushed in a pestle, each bridge and river and ronde-point. I know Fizi Territory mostly by just the utter sense of remoteness it inspires whenever I visit. This is my home in the Congo.

A few months ago, I wrote a couple blogs about SOS FED’s participation in a UNFPA data-mapping project underway in the Kivus. SOS FED center staff have been filling out a 3-page survey with information on each survivor of sexual violence that the center receives. This data collection is being facilitated in Uvira and Fizi Territories by Arche d’Alliance. A fortunate side-effect of participation in this project is that SOS FED and Arche have been working closer together than ever before.

This past week, I had the opportunity to visit the UNFPA office in Bukavu, the provincial capital of Sud Kivu. The Bukavu UNFPA offices compiles and processes all of the data collected in Sud Kivu in the 8 territories: Kalehe, Mwenga, Idjwi, Shabunda, Walungu, Kabare, Uvira, and Fizi.

The UNFPA Sud Kivu office just released a report on the data it has collected for the first trimester of 2011 (January-April), and the data coming out of Fizi Territory is less than encouraging. In the first trimester of 2011, 118 rape cases were recorded by the UNFPA partners in Fizi, making it the territory with the second highest rate of sexual violence in the province. First place for the first 2011 trimester went to Mwenga Territory, which recorded 185 cases.

Over half of the recorded cases in the first trimester of 2011 in Fizi Territory belonged to the infamous January 1st mass rape in Fizi Centre, committed by FARDC troops under the command of Col. Kibibi. For their role in this incident, Col. Kibibi and several of his men were convicted and sentenced to prison terms by a Congolese military tribunal. Despite the isolated magnitude of the January 1st event, the sexual violence trends for the first trimester continue to be worrisome. It will be interesting to see the data for the next trimester, especially in light of the Nyakiele mass rape in June.

UN convoy on the road from Baraka to Uvira

UN convoy on the road from Baraka to Uvira

Field projects focusing on stabilization on the part of UNFPA and other UN organizations remain limited in Fizi Territory.

“L’axe est trop chaud.” Dr. Aziza told us.

The security situation in Fizi is obviously precarious, with a multitude of non-state armed groups still operating with impunity. Until the security situation is improved, UNFPA and other organizations such as UNICEF remain outside of Fizi Territory.

I have also found out a few interesting facts about STAREC: out of its $200 million dollar budget, only $5 million is dedicated to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) issues. Out of the $5 million, $500,000 is being used for the data-mapping project in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri, of which the South Kivu base received $200,000. This may seem like quite a bit of money, but for a project of its scope in a space as large as South Kivu, it may not be quite enough. In addition, the data-mapping project ends in 2012; while the UNFPA staff in Bukavu is counting on an extension with assistance from the Canadian government, this type of project needs broader support in order to continue in a relevant manner.

One source of much-needed support for the data-mapping project is from the Congolese government and from local Congolese partners. The UNFPA uses the CTLVS (Comité Territoriale de la Lutte contre la Violence Sexuelle) as a focal point for collecting its information in Sud Kivu. The CTLVS is a government initiative to coordinate and orient the various organizations working on sexual violence issues throughout the country. However, it is clear that the CTLVS has not quite yet found its place in the grand scheme of the things, and many local organizations in Uvira and Fizi do not engage with the CTLVS or with each other.

Dr. Aziza emphasized that synergy, cooperation, and coordination are essential for local organizations working in the Congo. Indeed, if things like the UNFPA data-mapping project and the CTLVS are to be effective and relevant, all the actors in the zone must work together.