After yesterday’s somewhat guardedly optimistic blog about Congolese Election Day, it is becoming clearer that many Congolese people are unhappy about the voting process and the possible outcome, and many more are fearful of violent reactions from political groups.

According to the NY Times, the head of CENI is threatening to disqualify thousands of opposition votes, due to attacks on polling stations in areas mostly loyal to Etienne Tshisekedi and other opposition candidates.  This, along with all the stories of voting fraud and violence filtering in from around the country, is sure to leave many Congolese feeling disenchanted with the entire process.  In addition, many international observers have described the voting process as chaotic and “problematic”.  A few independent organizations have publicly denounced voting irregularities.

In even more interesting news, the BBC is reporting that 4 opposition candidates, including Vital Kamerhe, are declaring the entire election fraudulent and demanding an annulment of the results.  These candidates are specifically accusing the CENI and Joseph Kabila of being responsible for voting irregularities (see the link for a list of the alleged irregularities).  Again, potentially troubling, as further delays and further mistrust in the process may signal an increase in violent confrontations between opposition supporters and state security elements.

Kabila’s constitutional mandate will end on December 6th.  If there is no clear winner by then, or if the loser(s) reject the declared winner of the election, it may be the start of a new era of violence and unrest in the Congo.

At this critical juncture, Congo still has the potential to spiral out of control.  Will Congo descend into the post-election madness experienced by Cote d’Ivoire earlier this year?  Right now, it seems entirely possible.

Yesterday, I spoke with a Bujumbura-residing Uvirois who had went back to Uvira to vote over the weekend; he grimly showed me the ink-stain on his thumb with which he certified his ballot.  He told me that Uvira was calm and violence-free on Election Day.  However, he expressed strong dissatisfaction with the entire election process, based on the numerous accounts of fraud and violence from other regions.  He also bemoaned the lack of international election observers in Uvira.  While not a representative sample, the angry words and angry actions being expressed by many Congolese across the country are testament to a common spirit of discontent with the voting process for those who are hoping to unseat Kabila.

So, I am about four months into my 12-month stint here in the Congo. It has been an interesting experience thus far. Time for some deep thoughts, reflections:

-The weather has not changed at all since January. It is still very hot, very sticky, and rains frequently. It kind of feels like living inside the gym locker of your average high school football player in August. In about a month, the dry season will arrive and Uvira will become dry and dusty instead of muggy and wet.

-Electricity is as infrequent as ever…as I write this our house has not had power for over two weeks. This is despite the fact we pay our bills regularly.

-I’m starting to enjoy going to the market and buying produce for dinner. I’m also keeping fairly vegetarian, with the occasional fish from Tanganyika to make dinner a little heartier.

-I am surprised at how much safer Uvira feels since I was here last in 2009. Of course, security continues to be a big problem in more remote areas of Sud Kivu, but considering at how open warfare and violence used to occur quite regularly in and around Uvira so recently, it’s nice to know things have calmed down a bit. This may all change as the Presidential election date draws closer, but I’m keeping my fingers crossed.

-As I study more about the history of the Congo/Zaire, I am amazed at how Mobutu’s legacy is still manifesting itself today in the DRC’s present troubles, even in problems that SOS FED and myself have to deal with on a daily basis. Not that we shouldn’t hold current leadership accountable, but it is incredible how such an awful leader could stay in power for so long and screw up such a large country so badly. I’ll probably write more about this later.

-I am still astounded at how big the DRC is. South Kivu seems enormous, especially when having to travel on poorly maintained roads, but it is hardly among the larger provinces of the Congo.

A road in the jungles of Fizi

A road in the jungles of Fizi

-My Kiswahili is getting better, although nowhere near what I want it to be. I’m also trying out my Kibembe more and more, with mixed results. In Kibembe, the words for “chicken” and “grandmother” sound very similar, and I had to learn this the hard way.

-Last night when I went to bed, there were distant lightning and thunder from somewhere a bit distant. I fell asleep trying to estimate the distance of the storm by counting the seconds between the flash of lightning and the rumble of thunder. However, sometime in the night the storm arrived right on top of us in a cacophony of light, sound, and pounding rain, and it woke me up. I eventually fell back asleep and dreamed of fighting off zombie lobsters in the household section of Target.

-From some of my travels through different parts of the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi, I’m fascinated at how the landscape changes and the particularities of each little corner of this part of Africa, from the onion-sellers in the small villages of northern Burundi to Kigali’s cool breezes and skyscrapers to Bujumbura’s laid-back charm to Baraka’s post-apocalyptic atmosphere to the general sleaze of Bukavu to the roadside milk-and-cheese merchants of Luberizi to the jungle chatter of insects and birds in the mud pits of Fizi to the urgent vista of the Ubwari Peninsula as viewed from the road near Baraka to the tranquil Tanganyika lakeshore in Mboko…

-No sightings of Gustave the Crocodile yet.

There are a few corrections to my coverage of the Kikoze mass rape incident:

-I originally reported the date of the ex-FRF FARDC attack and mass rape in Kikoze as March 31st. This date should actually be March 26th, 2011.

-I also reported that 9 survivors came to Uvira to receive treatment. The total number of confirmed cases in the Kikoze mass rape is 9; however, only 8 women came to Uvira to receive treatment and report the incident.

-The battalion commander for the FARDC unit in question is located in Muranvia, which I originally spelled Murambia, but I’ve seen it spelled both ways. The same goes for Kikoze; it can also be spelled Kikozi.

And now, more updates:

-The FARDC commander in Muranvia has confirmed that he sent his troops to the Kikoze to hunt Mai Mai elements in the area, but still denies that his soldiers raped anyone.

-The UN mission to Kikoze and Muranvia noted the high number of child soldiers among the ex-FRF FARDC troops.

-OCHA and CTLVS-Uvira are coordinating meetings between local organizations to come up with ways to provide more services in the Haut Plateau area, in particular in the area around Bijombo (which includes the village of Kikoze). There are several NGOs, notably AGAPE, AJDC (Associations des Jeunes pour le Développement du Congo), and Arche d’Alliance, that have created a synergy to bring psychosocial services and human rights monitoring to the Bijombo zone of the Haut Plateau.

And now, a bit of commentary. In my opinion, the follow-up surrounding the Kikoze incident is moving a bit slowly for a number of reasons:

-The Kikoze area is very remote, and therefore investigating the matter requires quite a bit more time and resource investment on the part of the UN.

-The media has not picked up on this incident, unlike the New Years Day incident in Fizi Town. This probably has a lot to do with the numbers, 50+ confirmed in Fizi Town versus 9 cases confirmed in Kikoze so far.

-In the incident in Fizi Town, there were MONUSCO troops stationed nearby during the attack and mass rape. Perhaps the UN moved faster on providing the impetus to arrest Col. Kibibi and his men because the incident happened where they were supposed to be able to protect civilians.

-The reality is that the MONUSCO mission in Uvira and Fizi is still very constrained by the lack of resources, a difficult operating environment, and the fact that these incidents are being committed by armed combatants on both sides. MONUSCO still has very limited presence in Fizi Territory and in the Haut Plateau of both Uvira and Fizi. Maybe there is also some lack of initiative from higher up; Margot Wallstrom, the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence, has yet to visit Fizi Territory, despite the fact that the region is sliding backwards in terms of sexual violence committed by armed groups. I don’t think it is going out on a limb to say that the Congolese government is also showing little initiative in terms of cutting down the impunity of its own troops.

On March 23, I attended my first CTLVS (Commission Territoriale sur la Lutte contre la Violence Sexuelle) meeting at OCHA headquarters. Up until that day, the Uvira CTLVS had 25 member organizations; however, my presence at the CTLVS meeting added SOS FED to the roster, making the final total 26.

The CTLVS is meant to be an official entity that coordinates the efforts of local NGOs working on SGBV (Sexual and Gender-based Violence) in Uvira and Fizi Territories. There are four sub-clusters under CTLVS, each headed by a member organization that specializes in that area:

-Judicial (Arche d’Alliance)

-Medical and Health (l’Hôpital d’Uvira)

-Psychosocial Assistance (PSVS)

-Socioeconomic Assistance (ASJPED)

Currently, the CTLVS is collaborating with UNFPA on a data-mapping project, trying to get a clearer picture of incidents of sexual violence in South Kivu, so better response efforts can be coordinated. One member organization, Arche d’Alliance, is charged with collecting information on incidents of sexual violence recorded by each member organization. However, it was clear at the meeting that this information was not being given to Arche, even when someone was sent around to each member organization’s office to collect it. The CTLVS director, Mme Bernadette Ntumba, expressed her frustration at the lack of cooperation. The reason given by some of those present at the meeting was “on n’a pas des moyens” (“we don’t have the means”).

Two days prior to the main CTLVS meeting, I attended a scheduled meeting for the sub-cluster concerning psychosocial assistance, at the headquarters of PSVS. I was surprised at the low attendance; besides a PSVS staff member and a secretary for another local org called AJID, I was the only other person in attendance. When I inquired why so few were attending a scheduled coordination meeting, Ms. Aimée Birindwa, the PSVS focal point, told me that it was hard to motivate member organizations to send people to meetings. Why weren’t the other local organizations motivated enough? She told me what I have heard from countless organizations: “on n’a pas des moyens” (“we don’t have the means”). The story over and over again in South Kivu is one of missing financing, not enough money to keep things running. However, there is never a shortage of NGOs that work on building peace, assisting victims of sexual violence, educating communities on SBGV, and building economic activity. Quite a few of the directors of these NGOs have bulging waistlines, travel on enormous per diems, and are building three-story houses in Uvira. Who am I to believe?

Perhaps this warrants a closer look at the economics at work in South Kivu.

Since Mobutu’s “Zairieanisation” in the 1970s, the economy of Zaire/Congo has been in a state of rapid decay. The war starting in the 1990s shattered what remained of economic activity and security in places like South Kivu. Most people in South Kivu have been poor and oppressed since colonial times, but the war and continuing insecurity means that there is little hope at the end of the tunnel. It is a little astounding to hear older people talk about how things were “better” during the Mobutu Era.

Even today, peasants flee their fields at the sound of gunfire. Internal displacement and the disruption of agricultural activity have had severe effects on public health and food security. The education system is in shambles and the roads are non-existent. Mineral extraction and smuggling has enriched the pockets of fat politicians and generals from Kinshasa to Kampala to Kigali and back, while fighting over these mineral resources continues to breed insecurity in the regon.

So, what is one source of income that continues to trickle into South Kivu? Aid money, development money, financing for humanitarian assistance. Granted, the deep humanitarian crisis in Eastern Congo merits attention, and I believe we have an obligation to help alleviate suffering and fight for social justice in one of the most troubled regions of the planet. However, it appears that money coming to South Kivu from international donors seeking to help the Congolese has created an atmosphere rife with competition, corruption, and deception. There is amazing work done by dedicated individuals in South Kivu, but there are also those who only seek to line their own pockets, whether out of desperation or greed.

Thus, you have two stories: NGOs that do little more than serve as ATMs for their corrupt directors, and NGOs that have decent projects but can’t find the financing to sustain them. There are many shades of gray between these two extremes; some organizations are very functional and do decent human rights work, but still use some of their financing and resources in ways that are improper and somewhat unethical. Some of the local NGO elite, especially up in Bukavu, are internationally recognized for their previous work and are therefore well-financed, but when the mzungus aren’t looking, they engage in some fairly dirty tactics to make sure that other local NGOs do not cut in on their action. Some organizations have good projects and some financing, but refuse to cooperate with other organizations doing similar work.

So, NGO work has become a business in South Kivu, at least for some. The sad reality is that such corruption and disregard for ethics from some NGOs are what discourage a lot of international organizations from taking a chance on good NGOs in South Kivu. Conversely, some local NGOs want the financing from abroad, but none of the required oversight that may accompany it. Since there are many local NGOs and few sources of funding, competition and jealousy overpower most efforts at cooperation. There is a corrosive mutual distrust, which ensures confusion and inefficiency. This is not a condemnation of either all Congolese NGOs or all foreign donors. The aid game is tricky, and all of us in the humanitarian assistance/international development community are still trying to figure out a better way of doing things. The history and simple economics of a place like South Kivu have created such a situation, and it is our job to be better informed and keep up the work, not to give up.

This is not new news to me; Ned Meerdink had to deal with the machinations of the bad NGOs for years, including when I was here in 2009. In Haiti, I had plenty of exposure to the corruptions of even the most well respected NGOs and religious organizations. With my background and experience, I think I can objectively state that SOS FED is not one of the “bad NGOs”. However, it is always tough to remain on the straight-and-narrow in a place where the good guys often finish last.

This is not a diatribe against anyone in particular; in this forum, at least, I will refrain from naming names. This is also not meant to be a grand commentary on the state of international development and humanitarian assistance. For that, you can go talk to high-minded economists like Bill Easterly, Jeffrey Sachs, Paul Collier, and Dambisa Moyo. In the meantime, here at SOS FED we will start faithfully submitting our monthly data to the CTLVS.

Uvira, South Kivu, DRC

Uvira, South Kivu, DRC

There is evidence of a growing humanitarian crisis in Fizi Territory. I have been attending regular OCHA security briefings to keep updated on the situation in Uvira and Fizi. Now, I will share some of what I have been hearing. We start in the Ubwari Peninsula, down in Fizi Territory.

The Ubwari Peninsula juts into Lake Tanganyika, south of Baraka and just north of Kazimia. In the month of March, battles continued between Amani Leo troops and Mai Mai Yakutumba on the Ubwari. Thus, accessibility to the villages in the Ubwari has been limited for humanitarian agents, and there is very little information on refugee movements and civilian casualties coming from the area. Fighting near Kazimia has resulted in at least 1 reported civilian casualty. Last year SOS FED closed the reception center in Kazimia, which was the right decision, given the current proximity of combat.

There are concerns about the lack of protection in the area around Kilembwe, in the Haut Plateau, where the FLDR is targeting the civilian population. Many of the mass rapes committed by the FDLR this year happened in the vicinity of Kilembwe and Kilimba. Supposedly there are plans for a larger Amani Leo operation to head into the Kilembwe area to drive out the FDLR. Right now, MONUSCO patrols only reach Kilicha. On March 14, more than 40 civilians were robbed by the FDLR on their way to the market in Kilicha.
The Mai Mai is waylaying and robbing travelers on the road from Uvira to Baraka, near the villages of Elila and Kabondozi. On March 16, a vehicle belonging to the NGO TEARFUND was ambushed and robbed near Mukindje, about 15 km from Baraka. In these incidents, there were no reported injuries.

In March, more FNL activity has been reported, throwing in another wrench in the machine. The FNL (Forces Nationales pour la Libération) is a Burundian rebel movement that is opposed to the current government in Burundi. In Uvira Territory, combat between the FNL and the FARDC on March 12 disrupted agricultural activity near Kiliba; when farmers hear that there is fighting close by, they become reluctant to go to their fields. In Fizi, as of March 15 it was reported that over 200 FNL troops were camped out in the forest of Lulambo, near the village of Kabembwe.

Now, we return to Uvira Territory, for a demonstration of just how difficult it is to negotiate the security situation in South Kivu. Due to increased incidents of armed bandits waylaying travelers in the Runingu area, the Pakistani Battalion of MONUSCO (PAKBATT) stationed in Uvira Territory attempted to create a Temporary Operations Base (TOB) in Kashatu. However, they soon abandoned their plans, due to a lack of support from the local authorities. Apparently, the local authorities wanted more and more money from MONUSCO for “permission” to put a TOB there, even though this would have increased security for the civilian population. Again, another demonstration of just how difficult it is, even for the UN, to stabilize the security situation in a region rife with corruption.

In February, Médecins Sans Frontières released a briefing on the “dramatic increase in mass rape and violence” in Fizi Territory. There are worries that the conflict in Fizi is entering into a “new phase of brutality”. In recent years, MSF saw a decline in reported incidents of sexual violence in Fizi; however, this trend is starting to reverse itself. The situation of women in Fizi, which has never been good, is getting worse.

On March 13, I wrote an entry about the cases of mass rape that have been rising since the beginning of the year. Please refer to that entry for a more complete picture of this “new phase of brutality”. Stay tuned for more.

South Kivu is home to quite a few ethnic groups, and with any area with fragmented identities, there are low-level tensions between these groups.  In Uvira and Fizi, there are many different tribal/linguistic groups, such as the Bafulero, Babembe, Bavira, Banyamulenge, Bashi.  Here is a little guide to the prefixes:

One person: Mufulero

Many people: Bafulero

Language: Kifulero

For example:  Josephine is a Mubembe.  She belongs to the Babembe people, and she speaks Kibembe.  There are a couple of exceptions to these grammatical rules; for example, the Banyamulenge speak Kinyarwanda, as their ethnic group came to the Kivus from Rwanda a few hundred years ago.  People from Rwanda are called Banyarwanda, people from Burundi are called Barundi (or, more commonly, burundais) and speak Kirundi.  In the Kivus, most everybody knows Kiswahili, as is the case in Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, and Tanzania.  Kiswahili has become the lingua franca in areas where people from many different ethnic groups are found, such as Uvira town.  In addition, most people know at least a little bit of the language of other ethnic groups.  Despite slight regional differences in vocabulary, one can get most anywhere in East Africa if one speaks Kiswahili.

One has to be extremely careful when talking about ethnicity, especially when it comes to the various armed groups.  Ethnic issues oftentimes are connected to political and military actions, but no armed group’s motivations can be explained entirely along ethnic guidelines.  Looking for a political motive is more worthwhile.

When the Rwandans invaded the Congo and continued to have a presence in the Kivus, part of their explanation for their invasion was to prevent the “genocide” of their “Tutsi” brothers, the Banyamulenge.  Simmering ethnic tensions already existing between the Banyamulenge and the “autochtone” tribes (Babembe, Bafulero) were one of the reasons why South Kivu was invaded, catalyzed by the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda and by the fact many of the perpetrators fled into the Congo and were regrouping there.  Depending on whom you talk to here, you will always get a different response as to who is the truly “victimized” ethnic group in South Kivu.  While political and rebel movements may be along “tribal” lines (the FDLR, for example, is a “Hutu” nationalist group), ethnicity may be simply be an excuse to further a selfish agenda. Politicians and military leaders exploit these differences; in South Kivu, the Banyamulenge can be portrayed either as bloodthirsty killers of the “native” tribes or as victims of “genocidal Congolese” and their “Hutu genocidaire allies”.  Neither portrayal is correct. Members of one ethnic group may be quick to recall the massacres of their tribesmen at the hands of another tribe, but won’t be able to recall the massacres committed by their own ethnic group against others; I’ve heard this quite a bit from Bembe people in Fizi Territory, who are quick to point out sites where Babembe were massacred by the predominately Banyamulenge RCD, but would be hard pressed to recount the anti-Banyamulenge pogroms/massacres that have also occurred in the area, before and after the RCD takeover.

Of course, this is not to say that ethnicity/tribal affiliation is something to ignore; one only has to look at the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to see the perils of ignoring ethnic tensions and how they can be exploited for murderous intent.  Ethnic divides can ignite hatred and suspicion, since it is that much easier to hate the “other” who doesn’t speak your language, looks a little differently than you, and practices customs slightly different from yours.

The FARDC in South Kivu consist of many Banyamulenge, including quite of the officers.  The Mai Mai are comprised of members mostly from the “autochtone” tribes, the Babembe, Bafulero, etc.  The fact that the conflict is delineated along ethnic lines is one reason why the Amani Leo troops are implicated in so many rapes in Fizi Territory; there is a lower mental/cultural threshold to cross for a Banyamulenge soldier to rape/assault someone of the “other” ethnic group, especially for someone they see as the “enemy”.  Same thing goes for the FDLR rebels and their general attitude towards the Congolese population.  The Banyamulenge are not inherently evil, and not all members of their ethnic group can be labeled as rapists and murderers, despite what some members of some other ethnic groups may tell you.  It is easy to see how the situation could be reversed if the FARDC ranks were mostly commanded and made up of members of another ethnic group.

This is not to say that all sexual or gender-based violence goes perpendicular to ethnic lines.  The second-class status of women in a patriarchal society make Congolese women all the more vulnerable to the designs of all predators, be they a soldier from a different region, their next-door neighbor, or even a member of their own family.  Taboos on denouncing perpetrators and the lack of a functioning law enforcement/justice system make the situation all the more difficult to gauge and ameliorate.

When I write about the Congo, I mostly try to avoid attaching ethnic labels to political/armed groups, except when necessary to possibly explain the reasons around a group’s actions/platform.  The point is that ethnic/tribal divides often exacerbate conflicts over land, mineral mines, or even cows.  Ignoring them only perpetuates ignorance, but simply attributing all the violence to “ethnic conflict” misses the point.  The war has political, economic, and military implications that extend beyond the region and even beyond the continent.

In the States, I’ve had to endure listening to many an American talking about “crazy uncivilized Africans” killing each other because of “tribal animosity” that existed “long before we [white people] got there”.  I greatly resent this sort of sentiment, mostly because of colonial legacy (remember, it was Europeans who created the whole “Hutu” and “Tutsi” false dichotomy) and the modern problems of Africa that have more to do with economics and politics than tribal affiliation.  Oftentimes these modern problems involve the actions of governments, corporations, and individuals outside of Africa.  I’d say that our culpability as Non-Africans is pretty well established.

It should be noted that the grand majority of Congolese people I know are fairly chilled out when it comes to ethnic differences; people from all different tribes and ethnic groups interact with each other everyday in the Congo without incident.

Many civil society organizations in Eastern Congo work to try and break down these ethnic barriers, reminding everyone that they are Congolese citizens first and foremost, and tribal differences should not be an excuse for violence, mistrust, and marginalization.  SOS FED makes no distinction between beneficiaries in terms of language or tribe, and all are welcome.

Good news:
Colonel Kibibi Mutware, the ex-CNDP Amani Leo commander who led his troops on a rape and pillaging spree in Fizi town on New Years Day, has been found guilty by a military court of crimes against humanity, and has been sentenced to 20 years in prison.
According to the BBC, this is the first time a commanding officer of a FARDC unit has been convicted of rape. This hopefully sets a precedent that will hold commanding officers accountable, and will therefore be reflected in the actions of their subordinates. This by no means signals the end to mercenary-like behavior on the part of the Congolese military, but perhaps the higher-ups in the military are starting to pay attention due to increased scrutiny. This will be especially interesting due to the number of rebel “armies” that are currently being incorporated into the FARDC; creating a trained, well-behaved military out of so many different factions will be quite the feat. Here’s hoping for the best.
The military court in Baraka also convicted 8 more soldiers under Col. Kibibi’s command, including 3 officers, and gave them sentences ranging from 10 to 20 years. However, the heavier sentences went to the officers, possibly again signaling to FARDC commanders that they need to be responsible for the behavior of their units.
An unusual aspect of the trial was the willingness of many of the survivors to testify against their attackers; forty-nine women stepped forward to give testimony in court.

Today Amisi, Marceline, and I are getting together a list of supplies we will be sending down to the centers in Mboko and Kikonde. This list includes basic necessities such as rice, beans, cooking oil, and soap. Thanks to these staples, survivors of sexual violence can take time to recover in the physical and mental safety of the centers.
Despite the fact that women provide the economic backbone of the Congo, it is horrifying to think that many are barely able to sustain themselves and their children. This is particularly tragic in the case of rape survivors. Rape carries a strong social stigma for women in Congo, and therefore the consequences in such socially centered communities are devastating. Women who are raped are often rejected by their communities, and even by their families. Some women at the centers will tell you about their husbands kicking them out of the house after they were raped. These women are falsely labeled as “prostitutes”, and because of the social stigma, they are often unable to participate economically in their community. Some of these women end up becoming prostitutes, as being already labeled as such means that it may be the only economic option available. Thus, what does a woman do to provide for herself and her children? She may end up selling her body, even after it has been ravaged against her will.

Of course, prostitution is widely available throughout this part of East Africa, especially since men don’t really have to worry about any social consequences for their sexual behavior. Abortion? Forget it, a woman can be thrown in jail for even saying she wants an abortion. Contraceptives? Only if the man agrees to it. A saying among a lot of men around here is that “you can’t taste the lollipop without removing the wrapper”. Translation: condoms are for suckers.

In this war-torn and politically unstable region, it has been an all-out war on women’s bodies, both in the form of rape and in economic terms as well. The message seems pretty clear: a woman’s body does not belong to herself, but instead to the man with the gun or the man with the fat pocketbook. The total breakdown of law and order and the nature of the war allow for this culture to germinate, as it would happen anywhere in the world under similar circumstances. Honestly, there is nothing more infuriating about working in the Congo than having to think about these realities.

This is why the SOS FED centers are so vital to building peace and equality. Women can recover without starving or selling their bodies. They can cultivate communally, harvesting produce in tranquil fields among others who have shared their experiences. They will have an income, through which they can buy soap and cooking oil themselves, and send their children to school. These women can return to their communities through interventions from the reintegration staff; they will tell their community leaders that these women should not be shunned.

Soap, rice, beans, cooking oil. We will pack it onto a big fuso (transport truck) and send it down into Fizi. When the harvest for beans and manioc occurs, we will get a fuso to bring the produce up to Uvira so the women can sell it at a higher price. The women of the Congo endure.

Congolese women in Baraka, Fizi Territory

Congolese women in Baraka, Fizi Territory

Yesterday my friend Vincent told me that Hosni Mubarak finally stepped down as Egypt’s leader, after many, many years of non-democratic rule. As we pondered this momentous change (Mubarak has been the head of state in Egypt for as long as I have been alive), we started thinking about other African leaders who maybe are past their expiration date. Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe was the first name that came to mind. We also considered Yahya Jammeh in the Gambia, Idriss Deby in Chad, Paul Biya in Cameroon, and of course our old friend Col. Gaddafi in Libya. Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, who was accused by the ICC with crimes against humanity and genocide, probably bought himself a few more years by allowing for a vote on secession and assuming the debt of the new Southern Sudanese nation. In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni is playing a delicate game of balancing one-party politics and international financial institutions preaching institutional reform. Morocco is still under the rule of a monarchy, although the current rule of His Majesty Muhammad VI does not even begin to approach the ironhanded rule of his father, Hassan II. There are even signs of a fledgling quasi-democratic state in Morocco.

Even in states with stable governments that hold elections, such as Abdoulaye Wade’s Senegal, there remain questions on just how democratic they are. However, it is interesting to look at the map of Africa and see the names that are no longer there. Omar Bongo of Gabon died in 2009, Lansana Conté of Guinea in 2008. Julius Nyere (“Mwalimu”) is gone, along with his grand plans for a socialized powerhouse in Tanzania. Bokassa, the outsized self-styled “Emperor” of Central African Republic, is long gone, although he is certainly among the most savagely colorful dictators the continent has ever known. In Angola, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was assassinated in 2002, effectively ending a Cold War chapter of civil war between the UNITA rebels and the MPLA government in Luanda.

The old leopard himself, Mobutu Sese Seko, was deposed in 1997 and died ignominiously in exile some months later. Mobutu came to power in 1961, backed by American, French, and Belgian allies seeking to prevent the huge territory from becoming a base of Soviet influence in Central Africa. Mobutu declared himself to be the “King of Zaire”, using state resources and foreign assistance to finance a lavish lifestyle. He also famously told his underpaid military to “live off the land”; in other words, use their guns to take what they wanted from the civilian population. It seems that this sentiment lives on in the Congolese military of today. When Mobutu abdicated his “throne”, his Western allies had turned their backs on him, since the Cold War had ended and they were embarrassed to be associated with this “dinosaur”. Here was the man who spent millions on plush residences throughout Zaire and Europe, who practically swam in pink champagne every day, and who had welcomed genocidaires into his country and played a tug-of-war with the world over the fate of refugees in his territory after the Rwandan genocide.

Some observers are curious if Joseph Kabila will end up as “Mobutu-Lite”. Kabila fils is no dinosaur; he says what the international community wants to hear, at least paying lip service to the ideas of democracy, development, and progress. He has promised the cinq chantiers, five areas of development and security that his government will work towards. Here in Uvira, the reaction to seeing a bulldozer stuck in the mud or a truck tipped over because of crumbling asphalt is usually a sneer followed by a reference to the cinq chantiers. What will Joseph Kabila Kabange’s legacy be?

Changes are happening all around us here in Africa, and these are just a few musings between myself and some friends. Supposedly, Bouteflicka’s Algeria is showing signs of being next in line for reform and/or revolution. I wonder what will happen next.

A fight breaks out in a bar in the dark of the night in the town of Fizi, deep in the territory that bears the same name. The argument is between a civilian and a soldier of the 43rd Sector, over a woman. In the resulting melee, the soldier shoots the civilian. This sets off a riot, and an angry crowd lynches the soldier in public.

News of the lynching reaches the troops of the 43rd Sector. To “avenge” their fallen comrade, a group of soldiers descended upon Fizi for a massive campaign of rape and destruction. So far, 50 cases have been confirmed, but as more people return the official number is expected to climb. The real number is probably much higher, since many women will not report that they have been violated.

The 43rd Sector is part of Amani Leo (“Peace Now”), a military operation charged with dealing once and for all with the marauding FDLR rebels who continue to ravage the Kivus. Their commander, Lt. Colonel Kibibi Mutware is a former CNDP rebel who was integrated into the FARDC as the result of a 2009 peace agreement. He commands a group of Kinyarwanda-speaking Banyamulenge troops, often resented because of the role of their ethnic group in the Rwandan invasion of Eastern Congo.
Lt. Col. Kibibi claims that the perpetrators of this mass rape were soldiers disobeying orders to stay on base. However, as the people of Fizi recounted the horror they survived, it became clear that more than a few witnessed Lt. Col. Kibibi urging his soldiers to attack the people of Fizi, directing them in committing unspeakable acts of violence. These accusations were serious enough to be included in a UN report on the Fizi mass rape. Also, it is not the first time that Lt. Col. Kibibi has been accused of human rights abuses.

It is a well-documented phenomenon when FARDC military commanders spur their troops to ravage the very citizens they are sworn to protect, and the latest incident in Fizi is quite possibly another instance of such a sickening perversion.

MONUSCO troops now patrol Fizi town in order to maintain order, and a Congolese military spokesman has stated that all who were responsible for the carnage have been arrested. The Congolese military supposedly has a “zero-tolerance” policy towards human rights abuses, and yet it begs the question why something this massive and atrocious occurred in the first place.

The general apathy of the Congolese government and the international community towards human rights abuses committed by the FARDC is bearing bitter fruit. Human rights training, reprimands, and the removal of some commanders who condone rape have not been extensive enough to cut away the cancer that plagues the Congolese military. Amani Leo is quickly becoming a joke at the expense of the people of Eastern Congo.

When does this end?