A Voice For the Voiceless

MISSION

The Advocacy Project seeks to help community-based advocates produce, disseminate and use information, and so become more effective advocates for human rights and social justice

The Humanitarian Invasion

The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was created by Resolution 1244 of the U.N. Security Council (June 10, 1999). Its task was to restore stability and security and administer the province until such time as its long-term status could be resolved.

A British soldier protecting the unfinished Serbian Orthodox church in Prishtina.

It is hard to imagine a tougher assignment. Albanians were thirsting for revenge as a result of the crimes committed by Serbian forces, and within weeks thousands of Serbs had fled the province. On July 12, 14 Serb farmers were executed at the village of Gracko, near Prishtina.

The war also left the population deeply divided about the province's future. Albanians wanted independence, but Serbs wanted to be part of Serbia. Somehow, UNMIK would have to create common goals while avoiding a commitment on Kosovo's future.

UNMIK also faced a daunting challenge in the ruins of Kosovo. Garbage was piled high in the streets. The two power stations were barely functioning. Some 60,000 houses needed repair. The justice system had to be rebuilt from scratch.

UNMIK's first task was to get itself organized. Formally, the mission was divided into four "pillars," each of which was run by a different institution. The four pillars were Humanitarian (under the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees); Civil Administration (the United Nations); Economic (European Union); and Institution-Building (OSCE). In addition, NATO deployed roughly 40,000 troops in its Kosovo Force (KFOR). 

Late arrival: UN police with Kosovar police trainees.

Some of the pillars came together more quickly than others. One important component of civil administration was the U.N. civilian police (CIVPOL). They would have the task of training a local police force and taking over law enforcement as KFOR withdrew. But CIVPOL had to be recruited in their home countries, and after two months only 200 had arrived in Kosovo. It would be months before the first Kosovar police emerged from training school.

The humanitarian pillar, in contrast, took shape within days because it could draw on experienced staff from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) whose staff were working in the refugee camps.

Earlier in these pages, it was argued that Kosovar civil society had much to contribute to reconstruction. If this were to happen, it would start with emergency relief.

Some effort was made to strengthen those Kosovar groups that were indispensable to the relief operation. For example, the UNHCR invested in the Mother Teresa Society, because it needed the MTS network of centers for distributing emergency aid.

But in general, the international agencies devoted little attention to building the capacity of Kosovar groups. Instead, they relied on international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). At one stage, no fewer than 285 international NGOs were working in Kosovo-a huge number for an area the size of the state of Connecticut.

Kosovar organizations complained of the crush of international vehicles, the pollution, and spiraling inflation. They were particularly critical of the way that international agencies hired their best people at irresistible salaries and then put them to work on jobs with little responsibility-as drivers, guards, or interpreters. Handikos, the association of handicapped, lost ten of its best employees this way.

In another example, Nazlie Bala was recruited by the OSCE as a local interpreter, which meant that she was prevented from even interviewing victims. Given that Nazlie was arguably one of Kosovo's most experienced human rights activists, with more hands-on experience than OSCE's international officials, this was a wasted opportunity.

International NGOs also made the mistake of underestimating Kosovars. Motrat Qiriazi, the women's group, opened a new women's center in the Albanian part of Mitrovica in September 1999. Two months later an Italian aid agency (ADAB-Associazione Per le Donne Dell'area Dei Balkani) opened an identical women's center next door without even informing Igo Rogova. ADAB began to solicit clients on the street, causing great distress.

Igo Rogova was thoroughly disillusioned by many international NGOs:

"It follows the same pattern. You spend a lot of time helping them develop projects. At first, they're friendly. But gradually they forget their principles and start to change. They become the boss and claim the projects-without so much as a thank you. I feel like I'm in a colony!"

Igo was equally scathing about a multi-million dollar American aid program known as the Kosovo Women's Initiative (KWI). Modelled on a similar program in Bosnia, it sought to pump $10 million dollars into "women's projects."

KWI was the kind of project that makes a donor feel good, but it infuriated leading women like Igo because the money went through UNHCR, and three international NGOs ("umbrella agencies") before it reached local groups. In addition, the entire fund was to be disbursed by the end of 1999. Even the strongest women's groups, like Motrat Qiriazi, lacked the management capacity to spend large sums in a short time. (The KWI deadline was subsequently extended to the end of 2000).

Igo Rogova could not understand why Kosovar groups could not be entrusted with the money directly. She also felt that the UNHCR and the United States made a major mistake by announcing the KWI with a flourish. Several new women's groups formed with no other purpose than to apply for KWI money. Looked at from afar this might have given the impression of a vibrant civil society. But these new NGOs would be entirely dependent on a fund that would soon be exhausted. In the meantime, they would have to handle the administrative heavy requirements that came with being an NGO.

The backlash was not long in coming. UNHCR received applications from two of Kosovo's most prominent women-Aferdita Kelmendi of Radio 21 and Sevdie Ahmeti of the Center for the Project of Women and Children. The amounts requested were too large for the groups to manage, and UNHCR tried to engage them in a discussion. But the two women took umbrage and complained to the powerful chairman of a Senate committee that authorizes U.S. foreign aid. The committee instantly froze all U.S. funds for UNHCR's entire Balkans program.

This was an irresponsible move by the U.S. Senate. But it showed how unstable the relationship between the relief agencies and local civic groups had become in Kosovo-and how difficult it was to move from emergency aid programs like the KWI to longer-term development.